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THE CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS OF INTERPRETING 
SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Christopher P. Banks* 
At the beginning of Chief Justice Earl Warren’s last term, the New 
York University Law School held a conference to honor the centennial 
anniversary of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Two Justices of the 
Supreme Court, William Brennan and Earl Warren, gave introductory 
and concluding presentations in the book that followed. Brennan 
premised his remarks, titled “Landmarks of Legal Liberty,” on the idea 
that the Supreme Court has an affirmative obligation to enforce the 
rights’ protections found in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Brennan endorsed Congress’ decision, shortly after Reconstruction, to 
enact specific civil rights legislation that expanded the Court’s 
jurisdiction over the states and to realize the substantive promise of the 
Amendment through judicial power.  As Brennan rationalized, 
Congress’ investiture of the federal judiciary with broad power to 
enforce the limits imposed by the amendment reflects acceptance of 
two fundamental propositions. First, it demonstrates a recognition that 
written guarantees of liberty are mere paper protections without a 
judiciary to define and enforce them.  Second, it reflects acceptance of 
the lesson taught by the history of man’s struggle for freedom that only 
a truly independent judiciary can properly play the role of definer and 
enforcer.1 
As the passage reveals, Brennan’s conception of liberty (and 
history) works in conjunction with his comprehension of what his role is 
as a member of the federal courts and structures his non-interpretivism 
in Enforcement Clause cases.  For Brennan, Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment gave Congress the limited role of enacting laws designed to 
 
* Christopher P. Banks, Associate Professor of Political Science, The University of Akron. J.D., 
University of Dayton School of Law (1984); Ph.D, University of Virginia (1995). 
 1. William J. Brennan, Jr., Landmarks of Legal Liberty, in THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: 
CENTENNIAL VOLUME 3-4 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1970). 
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protect or expand upon rights that are a natural extension of the 
Amendment, but it restricts Congress’ power to take away such 
judicially-created rights.2 
Chief Justice Warren’s remarks, styled “Fourteenth Amendment: 
Retrospect and Prospect,” made clear that he shared his colleague’s 
conviction that the attainment of the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise 
of equality rested in large part with the Supreme Court’s discretion.3  
Whereas Brennan believed that the Court was both the “definer and 
enforcer” of Fourteenth Amendment freedom, Warren’s more sobering 
historical account of the immediate period following the ratification of 
the Civil War Amendments revealed that the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment mostly retarded Congress’ 
well-intention efforts up until 1875 (as expressed in five civil rights 
statutes) to make the Negro more free in a white society.4  The Civil 
Rights Cases5 and United States v. Harris6 demonstrated that the Court 
failed to live up to its responsibility to help the Negro by adhering to a 
“concept of federalism that was of pre-Civil War vintage”7 and, 
concomitantly, by not fully appreciating that it was best to defer to 
Congress’ explicit (and expanded) power to enact anti-discrimination 
law under Section 5.  By assuming for itself the sole power to define the 
scope of equality under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court took a 
document “that seemed, on its face, to expand federal legislative power” 
and transformed it into a “vehicle for the expansion of federal judicial 
power.”8  For Chief Justice Warren, this propensity was disturbing in 
light of the Court’s ruling in Plessy v. Ferguson9 and its increasing 
willingness, in a lassiez-faire economic climate at the turn of the 
twentieth century, to employ the Due Process Clause as a means to 
enforce property (instead of human) rights.10  Consequently, in refusing 
to give Congress “a meaningful role in Fourteenth Amendment 
enforcement,”11 the Court displayed that it was not institutionally 
 
 2. Id.  Justice Brennan’s line is drawn in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).  
Critics assert it is inconsistent to allow Congress the power to expand, but not retard, rights.  See 
Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title II: A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 81 (1969). 
 3. Earl Warren, Fourteenth Amendment: Retrospect and Prospect, in THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT: CENTENNIAL VOLUME 212-33 (Bernard Schwartz ed. 1970). 
 4. Id. 
 5. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 6. 106 U.S. 629 (1883). 
 7. Warren, supra note 3, at 220. 
 8. Id. at 222. 
 9. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 10. Warren, supra note 3, at 224. 
 11. Id. at 225. 
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competent to resolve the social problem of Negro equality that, in turn, 
destroyed its “essential function . . . to act as the final arbiter of minority 
rights.”12 
The Brennan and Warren viewpoints illustrate that even the most 
ideologically compatible jurists can agree on the objective while still 
expressing different conclusions about whether it is likely to be 
achieved.  While Brennan optimistically saw the Fourteenth Amendment 
as the means to effectuate positive social change in the benevolent hands 
of the Supreme Court, Warren was more circumspect and doubtful in 
light of the Court’s historic failure to do so. Hence, unlike Brennan, 
Warren was more willing to surrender judicial authority to Congress and 
share enforcement duties if it meant that the nation could move forward 
and “translat[e] the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise of equality into 
meaningful action.”13  With cases like United States v. Guest,14 South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach,15 and Katzenbach v. Morgan,16 Warren took 
some solace (in 1968) that the Court might be moving away from the 
interpretative constraints that cases like The Civil Rights Cases17 
imposed.18 Yet, he wondered aloud if it was realistic to think that the 
Court would be able to show the kind of moral leadership that would 
continue to break down the racial barriers that transformed America into 
anation that is “moving toward ‘two societies, one black, one white – 
separate and unequal.’”19 
Perhaps Warren’s remarks were tempered by a pragmatic 
inevitability (if not a little foresight) that the Court’s Section 5 
jurisprudence would surely change for the worse if more restraint-
oriented justices were appointed to the bench.  Given its dubious track 
record in affording Congress the legislative power under Section 5 to 
enforce the Amendment, he might have also intuited that the Court 
would be reluctant to loosen the state-action requirement in an effort to 
broaden the scope of Section 1 guarantees to encompass  private conduct 
in prospective non-racial discrimination cases.  In spite of what Warren 
may have believed, and even though he and Brennan might have differed 
on whether the Court might be the instrument for salutary change in 
 
 12. Id. at 228. 
 13. Id. at 227. 
 14. 383 U.S. 745 (1966). 
 15. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 16. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 17. 109 U.S. 3 (1866). 
 18. Warren, supra note 3, at 226-27. 
 19. Warren, supra note 3, at 228-29; id. at 213 (quoting from Report of the National Advisory 
Commission on Civil Disorders 1 (1968)). 
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equal protection law, both Justices nonetheless recognized that the 
substantive contours of the Amendment are shaped by the proper use of 
judicial power which, in the end, reflected the willingness of the Court to 
defer to Congress’ initiatives in enacting legislation that furthered the 
value of equality.  Stated differently, the constitutional politics of 
interpreting Section 5 is, in essence, a debate about the scope of judicial 
supremacy. As a result, all the rights expressed in Section 1 of the 
Amendment often hang in the precarious balance of those who hold, and 
aggressively assert, institutional power in the pursuit of ideological goals 
at a particular time in the Court’s history. 
In this way the Rehnquist Court’s approach to Section 5 
jurisprudence is identical to the one utilized by Justices Brennan and 
Warren in an earlier day when they, instead of conservatives, controlled 
the ideological outcomes of the Court.  While the contemporary Court is 
continuing to restrict Congress’ power through its construction of what 
the Fourteenth Amendment (and federalism) means, the non-
interpretivist judicial philosophy that defined the Warren Court’s legacy 
historically and expanded Congress’ authority was justified—and 
politically legitimized—by what the Court said Congress could do in a 
political system of separated powers and compound federalism.  What is 
different is who is sitting on the bench, and who holds the power to 
make such declarations in law.  Accordingly, the politics of 
constitutional interpretation are indeed profound, but typically center on 
a very old debate about state sovereignty that remains remarkably 
resilient in the face of ever-changing political, legal and social milieus.  
What may be distinct is the Rehnquist Court’s adamant insistence that it 
has the exclusive obligation to be the final arbiter of federalism, a 
behavior pattern that transforms it into an illegitimate body of judicial 
fiat, rather than a defensible court of justice.20  The Court’s self-imposed 
claim to be authoritative in matters of social policy has manifested itself 
in other areas of jurisprudence that also serve as an expression in the law 
of federalism.21  What is striking about the Court’s line-drawing, though, 
 
 20. See Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5 Mystique, Morrison, and the 
Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 109, 148-49 (2000).  The authors 
analyze the Court’s work in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) and conclude not only 
that the Court misapplied precedent, but also that they are “unaware of any other instance in which a 
court has gone to such lengths to derive controlling meaning from the presumed, yet unspoken, 
premises of century-old precedent.”  Id. at 149. 
 21. The Rehnquist Court’s micro-management of campaign and election law is an example 
that some have claimed not only illegitimately determined the 2000 presidential election, but also 
underscores the tendency for the Court to stake its institutional claim to be final arbiter in the 
political thicket.  See generally THE VOTE: BUSH, GORE, AND THE SUPREME COURT (Cass R. 
4
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is the length it will go to protect its domain while, simultaneously, 
running blindly into a host of historical, doctrinal, and institutional 
contradictions that call into question the soundness of its constitutional 
wisdom in Section 5 cases. 
This essay analyzes the Rehnquist Court’s Section 5 cases by first, 
in Section I, establishing how the Supreme Court has historically 
assumed the task of interpreting Congress’ power to act under the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Two periods, Reconstruction and then the mid-
1960s, are examined because they present contrasting views about the 
scope of what the Fourteenth Amendment and its enforcement section 
means.  Section II then surveys Section 5 cases from the Rehnquist 
Court in order to illustrate how its jurisprudence mirrors the anti-
federalist rhetoric established in the post-reconstruction era while, not 
surprisingly, departing from the principles set forth in the Warren 
Court’s egalitarian revolution.  Section III analyzes the Rehnquist 
Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence while predicting how the Court is likely 
to approach deciding Hibbs v. Department of Human Resources,22 a 
Ninth Circuit case the Court agreed to decide in the 2002-03 Term.  It 
also concludes that the Court, in Hibbs, is likely to apply an 
interpretivist construction of Section 5 power that will reaffirm the anti-
federalist doctrine established in the Reconstruction period and, as a 
result, reassert judicial supremacy, while missing another opportunity to 
align constitutional law doctrine with the framer’s more salutary design 
in creating the Fourteenth Amendment. 
I. 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment expressly gives Congress 
the power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the Amendment’s 
provisions.23  Under Section 1, the provisions are directed at prohibiting 
state action and guaranteeing rights of privileges or immunities, due 
process, and equal protection.  As Section 1 rights are stated in broad 
terms, Section 5 empowers Congress to make national laws affecting a 
vast range of state conduct and individual liberty.24  Accordingly, the 
 
Sunstein & Richard A. Epstein eds., 2001); Christopher P. Banks & John C. Green, Introduction, in 
SUPERINTENDING DEMOCRACY: THE COURTS AND THE POLITICAL PROCESS (Christopher P. Banks 
& John C. Green, eds., 2001); Christopher P. Banks, A December Storm Over the Supreme Court: 
Bush v. Gore and Superintending Democracy, in SUPERINTENDING DEMOCRACY: THE COURTS AND 
THE POLITICAL PROCESS, supra, at 237-64. 
 22. 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 2618 (2002). 
 23. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. 
 24. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
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Supreme Court has confronted the challenge of resolving two 
fundamental Section 5 issues.  First, can Congress use Section 5 
authority to apply the rights’ guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to non-state (i.e. private) actors?  Second, can Congress employ Section 
5 power to alter the Fourteenth Amendment’s substantive meaning in 
Section 1 by passing laws that change (or define initially) what the 
Supreme Court has said (or not said) about what the rights are? 25  Both 
questions directly address core separation of powers and federalism 
values because each fundamentally concern whether the Fourteenth 
Amendment is a grant of constitutional authority that Congress can 
employ to displace the states’ pre-Civil War role in determining, or 
safeguarding, individual civil liberties.26  While the Court has given 
different responses to each question during its political history, the 
Rehnquist Court’s Section 5 jurisprudence has brought into sharp relief a 
third question that is a derivative of the answers it has given to the first 
two: namely, to what extent can the Eleventh Amendment limit 
Congress’ power to fashion a legislative remedy that preserves civil 
rights and liberties pursuant to its Section 5 power?  With this issue the 
Rehnquist Court has underscored the anti-civil rights’ significance of its 
federalism doctrine.  Its approach highlights the difficulties in 
contemplating that Section 5 is both a source of rights (under Section 1 
of the Fourteenth Amendment) and an independent justification to gain 
access to federal courts whenever the states compromise liberty.27  Often 
 
 25. See generally GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
917-1021 (David L. Shapiro et al. eds., 13th ed. 1997). 
 26. See Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War 
and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863, 871-74 (1986); Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy 
History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1323-24 (1952). 
 27. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United 
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).  See Symposium, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints 
on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001).  In this sense, Section 5 is different, and 
perhaps more important to the civil rights struggle, because it provides not only support for 
congressional action under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but also legitimizes the 
litigation decision to sue a state in federal court in situations where state sovereignty immunity can 
be abrogated under the Eleventh Amendment.  See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). The 
Rehnquist Court’s Section 5 decisions premise the outcome of Eleventh Amendment and Section 1 
and Section 5 (of the Fourteenth Amendment) cases on anti-federalist legal principles that, more 
often than not, assume priority over competing pro-nationalist doctrine.  As the Court has held, in 
Fitzpatrick, Section 5 is an independent source of national power to abrogate Eleventh Amendment 
state sovereignty; but, by putting the sovereign interests above all else (most of the time) and 
making it virtually impossible for the Congress to meet its judicially-imposed burden to tightly fit 
its legislative ends with its legislative means, the Court is emasculating Congress’s power under 
Section 5 to either protect against state or private abuse of civil rights under the Fourteenth 
Amendment and the Eleventh Amendment.  Thus, the Court is nullifying, on federalism grounds, 
any meaningful attempt to effectuate civil rights through Section 5, and in the process, tilting the 
6
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the Rehnquist Court has looked to key precedents decided in the Chase 
(1864-73), Waite (1874-88) and Fuller (1888-1910) period, a time when 
anti-federalist sentiment, and racial tension ran high in the wake of the 
Civil War.28  After these cases are examined, select rulings from the 
Warren Court are compared with them to discern the outer limits of a 
liberal construction of Section 5 powers.  It is against this background 
that the Section 5 cases come full circle in the Rehnquist Court. 
A.  Early Interpretations 
The Court’s first significant opportunity to explore the meaning of 
the Fourteenth Amendment occurred during the Chase Court with The 
Slaughterhouse Cases.29 This case set the tone for subsequent 
interpretations of not only Section 1, but also Section 5.  There, the 
Court refused to recognize that individual butchers have a right to labor 
under the Privileges and Immunities Clause, a guaranty that the butchers 
thought was jeopardized by a state law permitting the monopolization of 
slaughterhouses (purportedly as a public safety measure that controlled 
animal carcass disposal).  In holding that the clause only pertains to 
United States citizens and not state governments, Justice Samuel F. 
Miller reasoned that the states were the sole province for protecting state 
citizens’ labor rights.30 The federal Constitution, therefore, only applied 
to privileges or immunities of a national character, such as the right to 
petition the government, the right of assembly or the right of habeas 
corpus. Only a few defined rights, the Court rationalized, originated 
from the relationship between the national government and the citizen 
(and, inferentially, apart from Slaughterhouse, inhumane treatment of 
blacks by whites in the states was not one of them).31  Recognizing a 
 
balance of power in favor of the states too much.  In essence the Court is refusing to acknowledge 
Congress’s special competence to make legislative judgments on policy issues, as well as 
eliminating, for litigants suffering civil rights abuse, the possibility that national courts can entertain 
Congress’s legislative effort to provide legal remedies. As a result, in not respecting Section 5 as an 
independent source of legislative discretion (and authority) under either the Fourteenth or Eleventh 
Amendments, the Court is assuming for itself absolute control over social policy in the anti-
discrimination and civil rights context.  See Estreicher, supra note 20, at 156-57. 
 28. See generally ABRAHAM L. DAVIS & BARBARA LUCK GRAHAM, THE SUPREME COURT, 
RACE AND CIVIL RIGHTS 1-56 (1995). 
 29. 83 U.S. 36 (1873). 
 30. Id. at 71. 
 31. Id. at 79.  As Nelson comments, Justice Miller’s holding “for narrowing the reach of 
section one were flatly inconsistent with the history of its framing in Congress and its ratification by 
the state legislatures.”  WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL 
PRINCIPLES TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 163 (1988); See also Gressman, supra note 26, at 1323-58, 
1338. 
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different outcome, Miller suggested, wrongly allows Congress to usurp 
the states’ ability to safeguard rights and transforms the Court into a 
“perpetual censor upon all legislation of the States, on the civil rights of 
their own citizens.”32  Not only would this error “fetter and degrade the 
State governments by subjecting them to the control of Congress,” it 
“radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and 
Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the 
people.”33 
Although black civil rights were not directly at issue, 
Slaughterhouse’s anti-federalist rhetoric reinforced state power at a time 
when the national legislature was trying, through sundry Civil Rights 
and Enforcement Acts, to improve the political and legal status of 
blacks.34  The formal distinction between national and state citizenship 
did little to advance their rights, for it effectively read the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause out of the Constitution.35  Moreover, while 
Slaughterhouse did not address the scope of Section 5 power (but only 
the constitutionality of state law), the result signaled that the Court was 
not going to be receptive to ratifying Congress’ enforcement legislation 
if it expanded the Fourteenth Amendment’s meaning.  The message was 
emphatic, but paradoxical: state governments were in charge of 
safeguarding Negro civil rights, even though they were also responsible 
for enacting the infamous black codes that took them away.  There 
seems little doubt that by constricting the meaning of the Fourteenth 
 
 32. Slaughterhouse, 83 U.S. at 78. 
 33. Id. 
 34. The legislative response to the Civil War Amendments included The Civil Rights Act of 
1866, 14 Stat. L. 27, the first Enforcement Act (May 31, 1870), 16 Stat. L. 140, the second 
Enforcement Act (February 28, 1871), 16 Stat. L. 433, and the third Enforcement Act (or Ku Klux 
Klan Act) (April 20, 1871), 17 Stat. L. 13.  DAVIS, supra note 28, at 12-13.  The 1866 Civil Rights 
Act, passed over President Andrew Johnson’s veto, was inspired by the Thirteenth Amendment, and 
it aimed to undo the restrictions imposed by the black codes by granting blacks the same kind of 
rights (to make contracts, be sued, etc.) that whites had.  It also prescribed criminal penalties against 
anyone acting under “color of law” who denied them.  Id.  The first Enforcement Act’s object was 
to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment; the second Act levied criminal penalties against those 
interfering with black rights in exercising the franchise; and the third Act was aimed at curbing 
private conspiracies that often, with the use of violence, curtailed black civil rights.  Id.  Gressman, 
supra note 26, at 1323-26. 
 35. As Gressman puts it: 
The decision in the Slaughterhouse Cases has never been reversed. The Fourteenth 
Amendment to this day has never recovered its life blood which the Court there 
extracted from it. Completely shattered was the privileges and immunities clause upon 
which rested the intricate pattern of nationally protected civil rights. . . .  For all practical 
purposes the privileges and immunities clause passed into the realm of historical 
oddities. 
Id. at 1338. 
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Amendment, the Court (unwittingly or not) was aligning itself with the 
forces of racial bigotry and hatred.  Indeed, in several cases after 
Slaughterhouse the Court undercut Congress’ attempt to counter racial 
discrimination and make the Fourteenth Amendment a source of hope, 
instead of despair, for the emancipated race.36 
Two cases decided in the Waite Court, Ex Parte Virginia37 and The 
Civil Rights Cases,38 are illustrative of this tendency, even though they 
might have otherwise been significant opportunities to make Section 5 
congruent with the salutary intent of at least one congressional effort, the 
1875 Civil Rights Act.  In Ex Parte Virginia the Court ruled that a state 
judge who excluded blacks from jury service could be criminally 
indicted under the Act.39  Over the strenuous dissent of Justice Stephen 
Field, Justice William Strong’s opinion for the Court asserted that a 
“great purpose” of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments was to 
achieve a “perfect equality of civil rights” among all persons in the 
states.40  The enforcement clause gave the Amendments “much of their 
force” because it “enlarged” Congress’ power to enact appropriate 
legislation that made “the Amendments fully effective.”41  Furthermore, 
Strong declared that “[s]uch enforcement is no invasion of State 
sovereignty,” reasoning that Congress was acting pursuant to its 
delegated authority; thus a state “in exercising her rights . . . cannot 
disregard the limitations which the Federal Constitution has applied to 
her power.”42  His dissenting brethren, Justice Field, thought otherwise, 
 
 36. See, e.g., United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (refusing to recognize the legal 
validity of criminal indictments against three whites who conspired, with about 100 other whites, to 
deny blacks their voting rights at a political gathering pursuant to Section 6 of the 1870 
Enforcement Act); United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883) (invalidating the 1871 Ku Klux 
Klan Act which sought to protect against private conspiracies to deny blacks civil rights); The Civil 
Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) (holding that Congress is without power under the Thirteenth or 
Fourteenth Amendment to enact the 1875 Civil Rights Act, which guaranteed equal public 
accommodations and provided, in the case of violations, criminal sanctions).  See Gressman, supra 
note 26, at 1336-43; DAVIS, supra note 28, at 1-56. 
 37. 100 U.S. 339 (1879). 
 38. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 39. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 349. 
 40. Id. at 344-45.  See also Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (finding the 
Fourteenth Amendment secures civil rights to all persons). 
 41. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. at 345.  Justice Strong explained what is “appropriate” 
legislation by remarking that  “[w]hatever legislation is appropriate, that is, adapted to carry out the 
objects the amendments have in view, whatever tends to enforce submission to the prohibitions they 
contain, and to secure to all persons the enjoyment of perfect equality of civil rights and the equal 
protection of the laws against State denial or invasion, if not prohibited, is brought within the 
domain of congressional power.”  Id. at 345-46. 
 42. Id. at 346.  As Justice Strong explained, “[i]ndeed, every addition of power to the general 
government involves a corresponding diminution of the governmental powers of the States.  It is 
9
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contending that the national law controlled a state judge’s discretion to 
select, in accordance with state law, qualified veniremen.43  For Field, 
such meddling curtailed a state’s “absolute freedom from all external 
interference in the exercise of its legislative, judicial and executive 
authority.”44 
Whereas Justice Strong’s opinion in Virginia had the potential to 
offer some comfort for those endorsing a liberal construction of Section 
5 powers, its holding, on the surface,45 was more of the exception than 
the rule.46  The Supreme Court, in fact, more typically drew a line that is 
consistent with Justice Field’s view in The Civil Rights Cases,47 an 
outcome invalidating the 1875 Act’s public accommodations provisions.  
In nullifying Congress’ power to create an anti-discrimination law based 
on either Section 1 or 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Joseph P. 
Bradley’s majority opinion observed that the 1875 Act directly, and 
generally, regulated individual conduct, without reference to any state 
law on the subject.  The Fourteenth Amendment, Bradley declared, 
applies only to “State action of a particular character . . . [and] individual 
invasion of individual rights is not the subject matter of the 
amendment.”48  Section 5, he continued, only authorizes Congress “[t]o 
adopt appropriate legislation for correcting the effects of such prohibited 
State laws and State acts.”49  While Congress may, on occasion, enact a 
law that “in advance . . . meet[s] the exigency when it arises,” the law 
nonetheless “should be adapted to the mischief and wrong which the 
amendment was intended to provide against; and that is, State laws, or 
 
carved out of them.” Id. 
 43. Id. at 354 (Field, J., dissenting) (asserting the Constitution does not give Congress the 
power to regulate officers of the state who discharge state laws). 
 44. Id. at 362. 
 45. Instead of interpreting Ex Parte Virginia as a case that expanded the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s meaning, Nelson states that the Court construed the state judge’s acts during jury 
selection as being ministerial (instead of judicial), thereby helping to create a doctrine of judicial 
immunity and “hence . . . a weakening of the Fourteenth Amendment” because, inferentially, a 
flagrantly racial, and state-sanctioned, “judicial” act would not fall under the protection of the 
Amendment.  NELSON, supra note 31, at 184. 
 46. In addition to Ex Parte Virginia, the Waite Court made at least two other rulings 
vindicating Congress’s anti-discriminatory power and black civil rights in Strauder v. West 
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880) (holding that denying blacks jury service was an unconstitutional 
denial of equal protection), and Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880) (reaffirming Strauder).  
DAVIS, supra note 28, at 18-19.  But, with Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880), which held that 
juries did not have to be racially integrated in accordance with equal protection, the Court 
diminished the legal force of the principles outlined in Ex Parte Virginia, Strauder, and Neal.  Id. 
 47. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 48. Id. at 11. 
 49. Id. 
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State action of some kind, adverse to the rights of the citizen secured by 
the amendment.”50  Bradley’s analysis, which is roughly the application 
of a means/end test, prefers to ratify what the national government does 
only as a direct response to a pre-existing pattern of state conduct that 
necessitates application of the rights-protection clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.51 
These principles are the basis for the state action concept and 
remain at the cornerstone of subsequent Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence that inhibits it from pertaining to private behavior.52  Yet 
Bradley’s opinion was significant for Section 5 cases in other ways. For 
example, it illustrated that the Court would take the analytical step of 
determining the scope of Congress’ Section 5 power by inspecting the 
national legislation carefully to see if makes reference to, and is 
designed to prevent or fix, constitutional violations by the state.  By 
placing the onus on Congress to write a law that responds to specific 
state law violations, the Court is engaging in a rudimentary form of 
“plain statement” analysis, a principle that has long been a characteristic 
of restrictive Section 5 cases.53  Also, in rejecting the notion that the 
1875 Act might be considered corrective legislation, Bradley identified 
“corrective” laws as what “may be necessary and proper for 
counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and which, 
by the [Fourteenth] amendment, they are prohibited from making or 
enforcing.”54  Notably, although Bradley limited national authority, his 
choice to use the words “necessary and proper” are susceptible to a 
contrary interpretation, and one that is more consistent with the way they 
were used by subsequent Courts to increase legislative power, even in 
the Section 5 context.55  Finally, it discloses that Congress’ decision to 
enact “general” legislation (i.e. legislation that does not remedy specific 
state law deprivations) will run afoul of the Tenth Amendment because 
it displaces a state’s right to legislate on the same subject (i.e. say, 
passing an anti-discrimination law).56  Perceiving the Tenth Amendment 
 
 50. Id. at 13. 
 51. See generally Symposium, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis Under Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469 (1999). 
 52. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, infra note 181; United States v. Morrison, infra note 
215.  See also GUNTHER, supra note 25, at 925-26. 
 53. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991).  See generally DAVID M. O’BRIEN, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS: STRUGGLES FOR POWER AND GOVERNMENTAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 665-73 (5th ed. 2003). 
 54. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 13-14. 
 55. See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
316 (1819). 
 56. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 14-15. 
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as an affirmative limitation on what the national government can do, of 
course, is also a precursor to the argument Associate Justice Rehnquist 
made several generations later in National League of Cities v. Usery.57 
The majority position in Slaughterhouse was contested by Justice 
John Marshall Harlan I, who registered a lengthy dissent that mirrors 
many of the objections that would persist, over time, about the limited 
scope of congressional power.  While Justice Harlan had not yet penned 
his famous Plessy v. Ferguson58 dissent, he struck an identical chord in 
Civil Rights.  The majority erred, he began, because “the substance and 
spirit of the recent amendments of the Constitution have been sacrificed 
by a subtle and ingenious verbal criticism.”59 Harlan continued: 
“It is not the words of the law but the internal sense of it that makes the 
law: the letter of the law is the body; the sense and reason of the law is 
the soul.” Constitutional provisions, adopted in the interest of liberty, 
and for the purpose of securing, through national legislation, if need 
be, rights inhering in a state of freedom, and belonging to American 
citizenship, have been so construed as to defeat the ends the people 
desired to accomplish, which they attempted to accomplish, and which 
they supposed they had accomplished by changes in their fundamental 
law.  By this I do not mean that the determination of these cases should 
have been materially controlled by considerations of mere expediency 
or policy. I mean only, in this form, to express an earnest conviction 
that the court has departed from the familiar rule requiring, in the 
interpretation of constitutional provisions, that full effect be given to 
the intent with which they were adopted.60 
For Harlan, the Court ought to recognize that the law’s intent is to 
prevent racial discrimination, and to say that Congress had no power to 
prevent it is incompatible with prior cases, like Prigg v. Pennsylvania,61 
which upheld the Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 as a constitutional 
exercise of Congress’ implied power to permit the re-capture of fugitive 
slaves and preserve the master’s property rights under Article IV, 
Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution.62  How can it be, Harlan asked, that 
Congress has the implied right to recapture fugitive slaves but not the 
 
 57. 426 U.S. 833 (1976), rev’d by, Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 
U.S. 528 (1985). 
 58. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 59. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 26 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 60. Id. (emphasis added). 
 61. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539 (1842). 
 62. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 27-30.  Justice Harlan added that the Court found that 
Congress had “the implied power . . . to enforce the master’s rights” under the Fugitive Slave Act of 
1850 as well.  Id. at 30. 
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express authority, under the Thirteenth Amendment (and its enforcement 
clause, in Section 2), to safeguard “freedom and the rights necessarily 
inhering in a state of freedom[?]”63 
Harlan’s answer was unequivocal. It is absurd, he wrote, to 
eliminate the institution of slavery and then enslave the blacks again by 
leaving them in the care of the states, the source of their initial bondage.  
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited such an anomaly, and its 
commitment to end slavery and all of “its badges and incidents” is at 
“the foundation of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.”64  Because the Act 
does not prescribe the method by which individuals or businesses 
operate railroads, inns, or places of public amusement, the legislation 
also did not impermissibly tread on state power or sovereignty. 65  Nor 
was it conceivable that Congress could not use its constitutional 
authority under the Fourteenth Amendment to prevent, through proactive 
legislation, “hostile State laws or hostile State proceedings.”66  If 
anything, Harlan suggested, Section 5 enlarged Congress’ power by 
denying to states the right to engage in racial discrimination; but it did 
not (as the majority maintained) concomitantly increase judicial 
authority since the Court can always nullify unconstitutional state action, 
regardless of whether Section 5 existed or not.67 As Harlan put it: 
It is . . . a grave misconception to suppose that the fifth section of the 
amendment has reference exclusively to express prohibitions upon 
State laws or State action. If any right was created by that amendment, 
the grant of power, through appropriate legislation, to enforce its 
provisions, authorizes Congress, by means of legislation, operation 
throughout the entire Union, to guard, secure and protect that right.68 
For Harlan, then, the Court must use restraint in upsetting 
Congress’ legislative judgment, for “it is for Congress, [and] not the 
judiciary, to say that legislation is appropriate—that is—best adapted to 
the end to be attained.”69  Acting contrary to this (properly applied) 
 
 63. Id. at 34. 
 64. Id. at 35. 
 65. Id. at 41-43.  Harlan also observed that, in Prigg, the Court specifically “turned a deaf 
ear” to the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s argument that validating national power would be a 
“dangerous encroachment on state sovereignty.”  The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 30. 
 66. Id. at 44-45. 
 67. Id. at 45-46. 
 68. Id. at 46-47. 
 69. Id. at 51.  As he explained: 
The judiciary may not, with safety to our institutions, enter the domain of legislative 
discretion, and dictate the means which Congress shall employ in the exercise of its 
granted powers. That would be sheer usurpation of the functions of a co-ordinate 
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means/ends test, Harlan suggested, violates extant principles established 
in McCulloch v. Maryland,70 and it wrongfully denies to Congress the 
power to give blacks privileges or immunities (under Section 1 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment) that the states are trying to take away.71 
The judicial conflict in the Slaughterhouse and Civil Rights cases 
cannot mask the general trend of the Court’s anti-civil rights’ 
jurisprudence in the post-Reconstruction period.  Although the Court 
vindicated the rights of blacks in isolated instances, by and large the 
judicial branch, either through decision, indifference, or inconsistency, 
was far from being a champion of minority interests.72  Indeed, it was the 
champion of state interests, a fact that eerily presaged Justice John Paul 
Stevens’s evaluation of the Rehnquist Court nearly 125 years later.73  
Consequently, in the formative years after the Civil War, and lasting 
until (roughly) 1938, the Fourteenth Amendment was more akin to being 
an empty promise for those wishing that it would be an instrument for 
ending racial discrimination.74  Congress’ capability to use Section 5 was 
even less, as the Supreme Court indicated that it was not going to use its 
judicial power to ratify a liberal view of the Amendment, which in turn 
minimizes what the legislative branch could do in equalizing racial 
relations.  The Court was not receptive to applying Section 1 rights’ 
guarantees to private conduct. Nor, would it generally expand the 
Amendment’s substantive content.  In light of this track record, it is 
unremarkable that Chief Justice Warren, in 1969, had a dim view of the 
Court’s Fourteenth Amendment cases after the Civil War.75 
B.  The Outer Limits of Section 5 Authority 
In the Slaughterhouse cases to the Civil Rights Cases,76 and with 
 
department, which, if often repeated, and permanently acquiesced in, would work a 
radical change in our system of government. 
Id. 
 70. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 71. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 51-52. 
 72. See generally Gressman, supra note 26. 
 73. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. C. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 664 
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (referring to the Court as “the champion of States’ rights”). 
 74. Abraham L. Davis and Barbara Luck Graham aver that the Court’s opinions during this 
period “proved to be [the] blacks’ worst enemy.”  DAVIS, supra note 28, at 60.  They also assert that 
the Court, incrementally, expanded the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, particularly after 1935, 
and in light of the Court’s famous “Footnote Four” ruling in United States v. Carolene Products, 
304 U.S. 144 (1938), which signaled a more activist approach in crafting equality principles.  Id. at 
75-79. 
 75. Warren, supra note 3, at 212-33. 
 76. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1873); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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the 1877 Tilden/Hayes Compromise77 and, later, Plessy v. Ferguson,78 
the Supreme Court endorsed a pre-Civil War, or anti-federalist 
conception of federalism.79  That understanding envisioned the national 
government and states as co-equal sovereigns. As such, the former could 
only act properly pursuant to its carefully prescribed delegated authority, 
so unsubstantiated forays into the sacrosanct sphere of the states was not 
going to be legitimated by the Supreme Court.  The states were the true 
and traditional defenders of civil liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment 
was a source for rights’ protection only if either state action was 
implicated, or a fundamental right derived from national citizenship was 
compromised.  The Court’s role was passive, as it would not align itself 
with congressional efforts to equalize relations between the races, at 
least through expansive interpretations of either Section 1 or 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  Rather, it would only actively protect the states 
in those instances when the national government threatened the states’ 
co-equal status in a balanced political system of shared power.  In the 
spirit of the times, unless private property or business interests were 
compromised, it would not exercise its discretion to be a proactive 
champion of individual civil rights, in spite of the broad potential of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and the intent of its framers.80 
A number of historical and political developments, including most 
notably the centralization of the national government brought on by the 
New Deal, facilitated a doctrinal shift in Fourteenth Amendment 
jurisprudence, culminating in the “switch in time that saved nine” 
rulings,81 and shortly thereafter the decision in United States v. Carolene 
 
 77. Scholars observe that the Court’s participation in the Compromise (especially with Justice 
Bradley casting the deciding vote in favor of candidate Rutherford B. Hayes) brought an abrupt end 
to Reconstruction (with a pledge to withdraw national troops and a promise not to use force in the 
attainment of civil rights) and “reaffirm[ed]” white supremacy, states’ rights, and southern racism.  
Brent E. Simmons, The Invincibility of Constitutional Error: The Rehnquist Court’s States’ Rights 
Assault on Fourteenth Amendment Protections of Individual Rights, 11 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 
259, 365-67 (2001).  See also DAVIS, supra note 28, at 13. 
 78. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (holding “separate but equal” facilities are 
constitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 79. See Warren, supra note 3, at 220. 
 80. Law professor (and now Dean) Richard Aynes’ account of John Bingham’s role in 
drafting the Fourteenth Amendment discloses that Bingham harbored a complex constitutional 
theory that supported an expansive view of national power to protect civil rights.  Richard L. Aynes, 
On Misreading John Bingham and the Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 57, 66-74 (1993); see 
also HENRY J. ABRAHAM & BARBARA A. PERRY, FREEDOM & THE COURT: CIVIL RIGHTS & 
LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES 9-10 (6th ed. 1994) (observing that the Court, from 1836 to 1930, 
was inclined to protect state authority and, increasingly, “the sanctity of property”). 
 81. West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a state minimum wage 
protection law); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National 
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Products and its famous Footnote Four.82  In time, the rise of the 
administrative state, when combined with the judiciary’s increased 
enforcement of civil rights and liberties under the so-called “double 
standard”83 of the Fourteenth Amendment, restructured the relationship 
between the national and state governments and, for the second time in 
history,84 tilted the balance of power towards the former instead of the 
latter.  The states, which were now subject to a judicially-created 
doctrine of selective incorporation that inexorably nationalized most of 
the Bill of Rights, increasingly were faced with the political reality that 
the federal Constitution generally, and the Fourteenth Amendment 
specifically, was a substantial source of civil liberty.85 These 
transformations greatly helped politically disadvantaged and minority 
interests because the Supreme Court began to use the Fourteenth 
Amendment as more of a sword instead of a shield against recalcitrant 
states that denied civil rights and liberties, particularly in the area of 
voting rights, criminal justice, public accommodations and higher 
education.86 
The second era of national expansion coincided, in part, with the 
Warren Court (1953-69) and its respective due process and egalitarian 
revolutions.87  In arguably its most important civil rights ruling, Brown 
v. Board of Education88 the Court not only rejected the doctrinal premise 
of Plessy’s “separate but equal doctrine,” but also sought to go “where 
no court had ever gone before [and] dismantle an entrenched social 
 
Labor Relations Act of 1935). These rulings signaled that the Court would uphold, instead of reject, 
legislative power (and, on a national level, the New Deal) and a posture that only a few years earlier 
looked quite improbable.  ABRAHAM, supra note 80, at 10-11. 
 82. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).  The three paragraphs of Footnote 4 signal, inter alia, that a 
law conflicting with the Bill of Rights is presumptively unconstitutional, as well as, greater judicial 
scrutiny in evaluating legislation that undermines civil rights and the interests of “discrete and 
insular” minorities.  Id.  See also ABRAHAM, supra note 80, at 17-22; DAVIS, supra note 28, at 77. 
 83. ABRAHAM, supra note 80, at 9-29. 
 84. The first time was during the Marshall Court, where the Supreme Court was interested in 
expanding Congress’s legislative power over commerce.  See id. at 9. 
 85. Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s Opinion for the Court in Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 
(1937), is often credited with constitutionalizing the “preferred freedoms” doctrine, or “concept of 
ordered liberty,” that reflected the Court’s commitment to incorporate, selectively, specific 
provisions of the national Bill of Rights under due process clause for the purpose of applying them 
against the action of state governments.  Prior to Palko, the Court, in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 
243 (1833), refused to do so, leaving wharf owner Barron without a federal remedy under the 
takings clause of the Fifth Amendment in his lawsuit for damages against the City of Baltimore for 
dredging Baltimore’s harbor and ruining access to Barron’s wharf. 
 86. DAVIS, supra note 28, at 60, 75-77.  See generally id. at 57-114. 
 87. See LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS (2000). 
 88. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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order.”89  Ironically, the cultural attitude under more rigorous judicial 
scrutiny was the byproduct of the anti-federalist mindset that the Court 
itself helped to ratify, in spite of the Union victory in the Civil War: that 
racial segregation was a local issue that was (perhaps) morally justified 
but, in any event, must be handled by the states without national 
interference.90 Until Brown, the Supreme Court, by and large, showed 
little inclination to rebut the cultural presumption of white supremacy.  
But, with Brown and its second “all deliberate speed” enforcement 
decision91 along with Cooper v. Aaron,92 the Court was now poised to 
wield its own moral authority, and judicial power, to implement Brown’s 
racial integration mandate.93 
Although some in the legal academy downplay the Court’s role in 
the civil rights struggle in the 1950s and 1960s,94 it is not happenstance 
that the political branches stepped up their fight against racial 
discrimination and Southern resistance to Brown with a bevy of statutes 
and executive action geared toward enfranchising blacks and breaking 
down the barriers of state-sanctioned legal segregation.95 Undoubtedly 
the country became more sympathetic to the victims of racial bigotry 
after witnessing the violent reaction of government officials in 
Birmingham, Alabama and, later, Selma, Mississippi, that forcibly 
resisted integration in the early 1960s.96  Still, the Civil Rights Act of 
 
 89. POWE, supra note 87, at 27. 
 90. Id. at 34. 
 91. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955) (holding that implementation of Brown 
I should proceed “with all deliberate speed”). 
 92. 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 93. The Court, however, occasionally took the lead in attacking racial segregation.  See, e.g., 
Guinn v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915) (invalidating grandfather clauses that restrict black 
voting rights).  The Roosevelt Administration created a Civil Liberties Unit in the Department of 
Justice in 1939, and then later helped launch a Committee on Fair Employment Practices to 
superintend business practices with the national government.  President Harry Truman also took 
executive action against racism ordering, inter alia, that the military must be integrated.  O’BRIEN, 
supra note 53, at 1322-23. 
 94. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN THE COURTS BRING ABOUT 
SOCIAL CHANGE? 336-43 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991). 
 95. See the policy decisions by the Kennedy, and subsequently the Johnson, Administrations 
to make civil rights enforcement a priority in the aftermath of Brown.  O’BRIEN, supra note 53, at 
1324-25. 
 96. POWE, supra note 87, at 223-25 (recounting Martin Luther King’s successful, but 
controversial, decision to enlist children in the civil rights’ protests in Birmingham, one that allowed 
public opinion to change in favor of the protesters after children were seen being pelted with high 
pressure fire hoses); id. at 225-26 (describing the assassination of Medgar Evers, an NAACP 
organizer, in Jackson, Mississippi, at the end of a ten-week period of civil rights protests in 186 
cities, with nearly 15,000 arrests); id. at 232-33 (describing the outrage, and rioting, following a 
bombing of a Baptist Church in Birmingham that killed and injured several children, which served 
as a partial impetus for the 1964 Civil Rights Act).  In speaking about Brown’s effect and the Civil 
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1964 (at first, reluctantly) proposed by the Kennedy Administration 
languished in Congress until John F. Kennedy’s assassination in Dallas 
in November, 1963.97 Shortly thereafter, his successor, President Lyndon 
Baines Johnson, and ultimately Congress, ushered it into law in 
February, 1964, and the landmark legislation was soon to be followed by 
the path-breaking Voting Rights Act of 1965.98 
Although the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 
1965 had the combined effect of equalizing public accommodations and 
enfranchising, each law was immediately challenged.  The Warren Court 
responded in kind with landmark cases that reinterpreted the scope of 
Congress’ power to enforce civil and voting rights legislation under the 
Civil War Amendments.  The first, an eight-to-one ruling in South 
Carolina v. Katzenbach penned by the Chief Justice,99 reinvigorated the 
enforcement clause (Section 2) of the Fifteenth Amendment and 
rebuffed South Carolina’s claim that the Voting Rights Act improperly 
barred the state from using certain voting qualifications (e.g. literacy 
tests) as prerequisites for exercising the franchise.  After surveying the 
prior, but invariably futile, legislative and executive efforts to stop the 
“widespread ‘pattern or practice’”100 of voting discrimination in select 
southern states, Warren reiterated the legal rule that Congress is 
empowered to “use any rational means to effectuate the constitutional 
prohibition of racial discrimination in voting.”101  Congress, which is 
“chiefly responsible for implementing the prohibitions by appropriate 
legislation,” had plenary power under Section 2 and McCulloch v. 
Maryland to devise specific remedies for achieving its legislative 
ends.102  The legislature, moreover, extensively studied the problem and 
 
Rights Act’s passage, Powe states that “[t]he entire weight of the federal government was available 
to make equal opportunities a reality.”  Id. at 234. 
 97. The 1964 Civil Rights Act is based on Congress’ commerce authority instead of Section 5 
of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Its main provisions (Title II) outlawed discrimination in public 
accommodations supported by State action, but it also loosened or ended some state restrictions 
(like literacy tests) on voting.  The voting rights component was a forerunner of the Voting Rights 
Act of 1965.  DAVIS, supra note 28, at 132-33, 149-51.  The Civil Rights Act also barred 
employment discrimination in Title VII.  O’BRIEN, supra note 53, at 1325. 
 98. The Voting Rights Act of 1965, which is based on Congress’s power in Section 2 of the 
Thirteenth Amendment to end racial inequality, is a comprehensive, remedial statute aimed at 
eliminating voting qualifications based on race, and it gives the U.S. Attorney General a preemptive 
role in monitoring voting discrimination practices through “preclearance” of state changes to 
election laws.  O’BRIEN, supra note 53, at 773-74; DAVIS, supra note 28, at 132-33. 
 99. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 100. Id. at 312. 
 101. Id. at 324. 
 102. Id. at 326.  There, Warren stated that Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, “[l]et the end be 
legitimate, let it be within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which 
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engaged in lengthy deliberations in considering what the best solution 
was to what Warren called an “insidious and pervasive evil” that was 
“perpetuated in certain parts of [the] country through unremitting and 
ingenious defiance of the Constitution.”103  Nothing Congress did in the 
Voting Rights Act, Warren thus observed, encroached on the states’ 
reserved powers, nor insulated them from federal judicial review, 
because state power cannot be “used as an instrument for circumventing 
a federally protected right.”104 
While the Supreme Court acknowledged Congress had reacted to 
correcting a pre-existing discrimination problem in the states, South 
Carolina’s significance rests with the inference that the judiciary would 
sanction Congress’ use of Section 2 enforcement power in future, 
undefined areas of social policy.105  Clearly, with its references to 
McCulloch and its invocation of rational basis as the guiding principles 
of the outcome, Warren’s opinion indicated that the Court would be 
more of a rubber stamp instead of an axe in cases where the exercise of 
national power was challenged by the states.  What remained to be seen 
was how far the Court was willing to go in deferring to congressional 
will and, concomitantly, whether the evolving expansion of 
congressional enforcement power could withstand the test of time and 
political change. 
Together, with other Warren Court rulings demonstrating the 
breadth of Congress’ commerce and law enforcement authority to hold 
that state and private individuals are civilly and criminally accountable 
 
are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but [consistent] with the letter and spirit of 
the constitution, are constitutional.”  Id. (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819)).  
Warren used this principle to equate it to Section 2 power by saying that “[t]he basic test to be 
applied in a case involving [Section] 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment is the same as in all cases 
concerning the express powers of Congress with relation to the reserved powers of the States.”  Id.  
Significantly, in the next sentence, he said that the Court has “subsequently echoed [Marshall’s 
language in McCulloch] in describing each of the Civil War Amendments.” South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 327 (1966) (emphasis added).  Presumably, then, Congress’ authority in 
Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the same as when it exercises power in Section 5 of the  
Fourteenth Amendment, as well as in Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.  At one time, 
apparently this was the case.  See, e.g., Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Jones v. Alfred 
H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968). 
 103. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309.  Warren noted that the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees held hearings over nine days; and floor discussion in both chambers spanned nearly one 
full month.  Id. 
 104. Id. at 325 (citing Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 347 (1960)). 
 105. Theodore Eisenberg observes, for example, that South Carolina “established Congress’s 
power to proscribe a class of suspect practices without finding that in every instance the practices 
would be held by the judiciary to be unconstitutional.”  Theodore Eisenberg, South Carolina v. 
Katzenbach, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 291 (Kermit 
L. Hall ed., 1999). 
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for racially motivated behavior,106 Katzenbach v. Morgan107 represents 
the outer limits of enforcement power doctrine.  Morgan held, seven-to-
two, that a national law (Section 4(e) of the Voting Rights Act of 1965) 
removing literacy barriers for voting is a valid exercise of legislative 
power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, in spite of a 
contrary law from New York making the ability to read and write 
English a prerequisite for casting a ballot.  In reversing the district 
court’s ruling that held Section 4(e) impinged upon states’ power under 
the Tenth Amendment, Justice William Brennan’s majority opinion 
asserted that Section 5 permitted Congress to pass the Voting Rights 
legislation and that Article VI, the Supremacy Clause, nullified a 
contrary state election law.108 It also dismissed, with a number of 
historical references, the contention that Congress’ Section 5 power is 
limited to enforcing laws that come within the ambit of what courts have 
already determined to be unconstitutional.109  Such an interpretation, he 
wrote, would “depreciate both congressional resourcefulness and 
congressional responsibility for implementing the Amendment.”110 It 
would also be contrary to the framer’s intent, which was to make Section 
5 a powerful grant of delegated power that was in line with the 
McCulloch principle and, of course, the spirit of the Constitution.111 
Hence the Court could “perceive a basis” that Congress could have 
passed Section 4(e) to combat the inequality that illiterate Puerto Ricans 
faced in trying to vote in New York, facilitating the conclusion to uphold 
 
 106. See Heart of Atlanta v. U.S., 379 U.S. 241 (1964) (applying the 1964 Civil Rights Act 
against a hotel operator who refused to rent rooms to blacks under Article I, Section 8 commerce 
clause); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964) (finding the 1964 Civil Rights Act applied 
against a restaurant owner who refused to serve blacks under Article I, Section 8 Commerce 
Clause).  See also United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745 (1966) (holding, with a six Justice majority, 
that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to prescribe criminal penalties 
under 18 U.S.C. Section 241 to punish private conspiracies depriving blacks use of state facilities); 
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966) (finding Congress has the power to punish criminal and 
racially motivated conduct by private individuals and state officials acting in concert to deprive 
blacks civil rights under the “color of law” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 242). 
 107. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 108. Id. at 643. 
 109. Id. at 648-49, 659 n.7. 
 110. Id. at 648.  Justice Brennan expanded on this point by saying “[i]t would confine the 
legislative power in this context to the insignificant role of abrogating only those state laws that the 
judicial branch was prepared to adjudge unconstitutional, or of merely informing the judgment of 
the judiciary by particularizing the ‘majestic generalities’ of [Section] 1 of the Amendment.”  Id. at 
648-49 (quoting Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 282-84). 
 111. Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966) (citing McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
316, 421 (1819)).  Justice Brennan also cited Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345-46 (1879), for 
the same proposition.  Id. 
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the legislative choice.112 
By requiring that Congress only “perceive” that it had a reasonable 
premise for enacting the legislation, Morgan solidified rational basis 
review as a deferential standard by which the Court would judge 
prospective laws purportedly within the scope of any of the rights 
protected in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.  As a result, but 
with one exception, Brennan’s view of the Court’s role in Section 5 
cases is contrary to the one espoused by Justice Bradley in The Civil 
Rights Cases.  Unlike Brennan, Bradley was wary of national 
interference and would quickly use the Court’s authority to nullify 
legislation that encroached on the power of the states to make laws 
protecting, or removing, individual liberty.  Bradley’s version of judicial 
deference in construing the parameters of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
ostensibly an allegiance to the sovereign states; and, in theory, it was of 
little consequence that state legislatures’ could (and did) eliminate 
personal freedom.  Brennan’s loyalty, on the other hand, remained 
superficially, with Congress. But it mattered greatly to him if any 
legislature, national or state, compromised individual liberty because he 
feared that “the written guarantees of liberty” would ossify into “mere 
paper protections”113 without the judiciary’s help.  In this fashion his 
actual support lay with his commitment to the Fourteenth Amendment 
because Brennan, in Morgan, was willing to cede judicial power to 
Congress only if the national legislature enacted appropriate laws that 
enhanced, but did not restrict, Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.114  By 
understanding Section 5 power as an affirmative, but in essence one 
directional grant of power, Brennan was distinct from Bradley: both 
differed on the core issues of federalism and rights’ protection, at least 
regarding whether the judiciary should use its power to upset state rights 
when the national legislature acted to preserve Section 1 liberty.  Yet, by 
being one directional, Brennan was identical to Bradley since both were 
prepared to invoke judicial power when the situation, or the 
constitutional politics of the moment, called for it.115  Stated differently, 
 
 112. Id. at 653, 656. 
 113. See Brennan, supra note 1, at 3-4. 
 114. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 651 n.10.  In this famous, and sometimes sharply criticized 
footnote, Justice Brennan said that “Congress’ power under [Section] 5 is limited to adopting 
measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; [Section] 5 grants Congress no power to 
restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees.”  Id. 
 115. The “situation,” for Bradley, might be to protect state sovereignty and preserve, in the 
process, Southern white supremacy.  For Brennan, the “situation” might be to protect national 
power and expand minority rights, if Congress acted consistently with a broad conception of the 
Fourteenth Amendment; or conversely, it might be to reject national or state power if either 
21
Banks: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
BANKS1.DOC 5/5/03  12:07 PM 
446 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:425 
while Brennan might have been able to mask the federalism implications 
of his position by rationalizing that Congress usually enjoys plenary 
express authority over the states in making choices about how to best 
preserve liberty, Bradley might too have been able to minimize the 
consequences of his anti-civil rights beliefs by saying that the Court’s 
role was to protect the states, an outcome that would, in his view, best 
safeguard the balance of federalism. 
In dissent, Justice John Marshall Harlan II, the grandson of the 
jurist who wrote the stirring dissents in The Civil Rights Cases and 
Plessy v. Ferguson, exposed the arbitrariness of Justice Brennan’s 
interpretation by accusing the Court of reading Section 5 as a 
congressional license to “define the substantive scope of the 
[Fourteenth] Amendment.”116  For Harlan II, the majority violated the 
equal protection principle that New York was not under a greater burden 
to prove that it reasonably, and rationally, treated voters who were 
literate differently than those who were not.117  As a matter of 
federalism, Harlan also argued that it was a “necessary prerequisite [for] 
bringing the [Section] 5 power into play at all” to have the Court, instead 
of Congress, determine if having literacy qualifications violates the 
Constitution.118  In advocating judicial restraint, Justice Harlan II wanted 
“empirical” proof to show that Congress was acting to remedy a state 
law that the judiciary has said, or is willing to say, violates basic 
constitutional rights.119  In contrast to Brennan’s position, Harlan II’s 
theory of Congress’ Section 5 power was not one directional, for his 
federalism rhetoric allowed the legislature very little flexibility to 
determine, in theory, what the best solution was to the race problem in 
remedial Fourteenth Amendment terms.120 
Harlan II’s restraint-oriented interpretation of the scope of Section 
5 authority would prevail as the country, and the Court, became more 
 
legislature compromised personal freedoms under the Fourteenth Amendment. The point is that 
either Justice would employ judicial power to achieve what they strongly believed in. 
 116. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 668 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 117. Id. at 660-61 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 118. Id. at 666. 
 119. Harlan makes this point by comparing Morgan to Heart of Atlanta.  Id. at 669.  In Heart 
of Atlanta, the Court based its judgment on a voluminous legislative record of discrimination in the 
states, whereas in Morgan, there were no legislative findings of discrimination that support Section 
4(e)’s enactment and the argument that the Act would correct the constitutional violation.  Id. at 
669-70 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
 120. Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 649.  See also U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 784 (1965), where 
Justice Brennan said “[v]iewed in its proper perspective, [Section 5] of the Fourteenth Amendment 
appears as a positive grant of legislative power, authorizing Congress to exercise its discretion in 
fashioning remedies to achieve civil and political equality for all citizens.”  Id. 
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politically conservative over the next generation.  In light of the ensuing 
conservative retrenchment, the Court’s holding in Jones v. Alfred H. 
Mayer Co.121 remains a bold reaffirmation of Congress’ enforcement 
power under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment.  But the Warren 
Court was about to recede into history, so Jones perhaps is best judged 
as a constitutional relic about the scope, and promise, of what 
congressional power can be under Section 5 in the hands of a benevolent 
bench.  As the Court’s composition changed, Morgan’s rational basis 
standard would be replaced by a rigorous form of strict scrutiny that 
characterized the Court’s approach in The Civil Rights Cases.  Instead of 
framing constitutional issues in terms of testing Congress’ competency 
to make rational choices about the means it used to effectuate the ends of 
legislation it enacted under the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court 
increasingly evaluated the scope of enforcement power by asking if an 
independent judiciary can relinquish its supremacy to the legislature 
when it acts through its lawmaking to define the Amendment’s 
substantive meaning.122  Because the questions are distinct, so too are the 
answers that the Supreme Court gave about the scope of the legislature’s 
ability to protect civil rights and liberties. 
Beginning in the Burger Court (1969-85), the Court thus more 
actively sought to constrain congressional discretion by reasserting, and 
sometimes resurrecting, the concept of state sovereignty in federalism 
cases implicating the Fourteenth Amendment.123  Perhaps the best 
example is National League of Cities v. Usery,124 a five-to-four ruling 
that was later overruled when Justice Harry Blackmun changed his 
Usery, pro-states’ vote in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit 
Authority.125  Usery decided whether Congress had Commerce Clause 
authority to extend Federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) minimum 
 
 121. 392 U.S. 409 (1968) (holding Congress has enforcement power under the Thirteenth 
Amendment to fight private racial discrimination). 
 122. Compare Katzenbach, 384 U.S. 641 (Brennan, J., Opinion for the Court), with Oregon v. 
Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 209 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The role of final arbiter belongs to this 
Court.”). 
 123. See, e.g., Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112; Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 
(1976). 
 124. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). 
 125. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).  The membership at the time Usery and Garcia was identical with 
the exception of the addition in 1981 of Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, who replaced Potter Stewart 
and his pro-states’ right vote in Usery and then, in effect, in his place in Garcia. Hence, the 
dissenters in Usery, Justices Brennan, Thurgood Marshall, Bryon White and John Paul Stevens, 
became the majority when Blackmun switched his vote, thereby relegating the Usery majority 
(Chief Justice Warren Burger and Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Lewis Powell) to the dissenting bloc 
in Garcia. 
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wage and maximum hour requirements to state employees.  Although 
conceding Congress had plenary commerce power under Article I, 
Section 8, Associate Justice William H. Rehnquist’s opinion for the 
Court said there are limits in applying it to private activity since “the 
means chosen by Congress must be reasonably adapted to the end 
permitted by the Constitution.”126  Thus, he observed that “[t]his Court 
has never doubted that there are limits upon the power of Congress to 
override state sovereignty, even when exercising its otherwise plenary 
powers to tax or to regulate commerce.”127  Consequently, Rehnquist 
looked to the Tenth Amendment, which he suggested is not a truism but 
rather an affirmative limitation on national power, as the method to 
prevent national commercial regulation of the “States as States.”128 
Notably, Rehnquist looked to a trio of past precedents (penned by 
Chief Justice Salmon Chase) to emphasize that the “Court recogniz[ed] 
the essential role of the States in our federal system of government.”129  
In Texas v. White,130 for example, the Court established the principle that 
“the Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union, 
composed of indestructible States.”131  In Lane County v. Oregon,132 
moreover, the Court stated that the Constitution “distinctly recogniz[es]” 
not only the “necessary existence of the States, and, within their proper 
spheres, the independent authority of the States. . . .”133 And, with 
Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell,134 the Court asserted that “neither [federal or 
state] government may destroy the other nor curtail in any substantial 
manner the exercise of its powers.”135  As applied, these precedents 
demonstrated that the FLSA wage and hour provisions 
unconstitutionally interfered with “integral” state functions by regulating 
“attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government”; and 
Congress had no power to control these “traditional aspects of state 
sovereignty” under the Commerce Clause, in accordance with the Tenth 
 
 126. Usery, 426 U.S. 840 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 
(1964)). 
 127. Id. at 842 (citing Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) (where it said the Court 
had “ample power to prevent . . . ‘the utter destruction of the State as a sovereign political 
entity. . . .’”). 
 128. Usery, 426 U.S. at 842-43. 
 129. Id. at 844. 
 130. 74 U.S. 700 (1869). 
 131. Usery, 426 U.S. at 844 (citing Texas v. White, 7 U.S. 700, 725 (1869)). 
 132. 74 U.S. 71 (1869). 
 133. Usery, 426 U.S. at 844 (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 74 U.S. 71, 76 (1869)). 
 134. 269 U.S. 514 (1926). 
 135. Usery, 426 U.S. at 844 (quoting Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523 (1926)). 
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Amendment.136 
Although, in a footnote, Usery declined to proffer if the outcome 
would have been different if Congress based its regulation on either 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or Congress’ spending power 
under Article I, Section 8.137  Dissenting Justice Brennan immediately 
understood the significance of the Court’s holding for subsequent 
federalism cases.  He relied on United States v. California138 to maintain 
that the states are subordinate to the national government when the latter 
acts within the scope of its delegated authority.139  He chided his 
colleagues for “manufactur[ing] an abstraction without substance, 
founded neither in the words of the Constitution nor on precedent” the 
idea that Congress was disabled by the Tenth Amendment from 
regulating, through the commerce power, the “States qua States.”140 Not 
only was this position a repudiation of “a long line” of precedents 
holding otherwise (including McCulloch v. Maryland141), it was a result 
that “patent[ly] usurp[ed]” the role that the political process plays in 
imposing restraints on Congress’ commerce authority.142  Brennan 
thundered: 
My Brethren do more than turn aside longstanding constitutional 
jurisprudence that emphatically rejects today’s conclusion. More 
alarming is the startling restructuring of our federal system, and the 
role they create therein for the federal judiciary. This Court is simply 
not at liberty to erect a mirror of its own conception of a desirable 
governmental structure. If the 1974 amendments have any “vice,” my 
Brother Stevens [in a separate dissent] is surely right that it represents 
“merely . . . a policy issue which has been firmly resolved by the 
branches of government having power to decide such questions.”  It 
bears repeating “that effective restraints on . . . exercise of the 
commerce power must proceed from political rather than from judicial 
processes.”143 
For Brennan, Usery was a repudiation of judicial restraint and, 
 
 136. Id. at 845-52. 
 137. Id. at 852 n.17. 
 138. 297 U.S. 175 (1936). 
 139. Usery, 426 U.S. at 859 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. California, 297 
U.S. 175, 184 (1936)). In California, Chief Justice Harlan Stone repudiated the view that a state had 
sovereign powers by stating that “[t]he sovereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the 
extent of the grants of power to the federal government in the Constitution.”  Id. 
 140. Usery, 426 U.S. at 860. 
 141. Id. at 860-61; See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819). 
 142. Usery, 426 U.S. at 857-58. 
 143. Id. at 875-76 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
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instead, an activist result that improperly altered the balance of the 
federal structure by rejecting the notion that “political safeguards” of 
federalism would adequately protect the states from national 
overreaching.144 
In time, Brennan’s objections were vindicated in Garcia v. 
SAMTA,145 a 1985 ruling that features Justice Harry Blackmun’s 
decision to bolt from the Usery majority and write law professor Herbert 
Wechsler’s political safeguards’ argument into constitutional law.146  
But, as the sharp disagreement about the proper scope of judicial power 
illustrates, in 1985 the Court was not of one mind about what federalism, 
or what state sovereignty in a system of federalism meant.  Although 
Usery and Garcia centered on the Tenth Amendment’s place as an 
affirmative constraint on otherwise plenary commerce power, the 
federalism conflict concerned whether the states surrendered their 
sovereignty or, in later parlance, their “dignity”,147 at the time of the 
Constitution’s ratification by the states.  For, if they did, as Justice 
Brennan maintained, the states could not be co-equal sovereigns 
whenever Congress reasonably used its delegated discretion to achieve a 
legitimate legislative objective in regulating the national economy.  In 
Brennan’s view, showing judicial deference to Congress was an 
affirmation of the careful balance the Framers struck between that 
national government and the states at the founding. 
The Garcia dissenters countered by stating that it was wrong to 
presume the national political system, either structurally or through the 
principle of representation, can actually protect the states.  Political 
safeguards are superfluous, because they do nothing to preserve state 
interests in light of an increasing commerce power, burgeoning federal 
regulation, the popular election of senators (rather than from the state 
legislatures as originally conceived) via the Seventeenth Amendment, 
and the nearly omnipotence impact of interest groups in the national 
political process.148  More fundamentally, the dissenting position 
 
 144. Id. at 876-77.  Notably, Brennan cited Herbert Wechsler’s famous article for the same 
proposition.  See id. at 877, citing Herbert Wechsler, The Political Safeguards of Federalism: The 
Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. 
REV. 543 (1954). 
 145. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). 
 146. Id. at 549-55 (Blackmun, J., Opinion for the Court); But see New York v. United States, 
505 U.S. 144 (1992) (O’Connor, J., Opinion for the Court). 
 147. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 268 (1997); Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714 (1999); Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports 
Authority, 122 S. Ct. 1864 (2002).  See also Michael S. Greve, Federalism’s Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. 
L. & POL. 93, 97 (2002). 
 148. See Garcia, 469 U.S. 557 (Powell, J., dissenting); id. at 579 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); id. 
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objected to the claim that the states somehow relinquished some or all of 
their sovereignty at the time of the founding.  Accordingly, the argument 
about the Tenth Amendment’s effect on national power is only a 
corollary to the basic insistence that the states are co-equal entities in a 
dual sovereignty system of federalism. 
As fate would have it, Rehnquist’s prediction that the dissenting 
view in Garcia would “in time again command the support of a majority 
of th[e] Court” accurately captured what happened when he assumed the 
Chief Justice position a little more than one year later.  Further, the 
Court’s composition continued its lurch to the right with the strict 
constructionist appointments of Presidents Ronald Reagan and George 
H. Bush.149  Rehnquist was already the colleague of Sandra Day 
O’Connor (1981) when he was elevated to Chief Justice in 1986 by 
President Reagan.  The confirmations of Antonin Scalia (1986), 
Anthony Kennedy (1988) and Clarence Thomas (1991) positioned the 
Court to implement the kind of judicial restraint that often characterizes 
Rehnquist’s federalism jurisprudence.150  As the five conservative 
justices coalesced into a majority, the Rehnquist Court (1986 - present) 
has made significant inroads in curtailing, to an unprecedented level, 
Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth 
Amendment.151 It also has revitalized the Eleventh Amendment as a 
means to limit federal judicial power by using the state sovereignty 
argument that was temporarily defeated in Garcia in a string of 
subsequent, far-reaching Section 5 cases.152  At the core of the Rehnquist 
Court’s Section 5 cases is the anti-federalist conviction that close 
judicial oversight is necessary to protect local interests from federal 
domination since the U.S. Constitution, is structurally ineffectual in 
affording the states meaningful representation.  Accordingly, as it is 
 
at 580 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). See also David M. O’Brien, “Federalism as a Metaphor in the 
Constitutional Politics of Public Administration,” 49 PUB. ADM. REV. 411, 412 (1989), where the 
author observes that the Garcia dissenters could have also grounded their claims on other aspects of 
increasing national power, including plenary taxing and spending authority and, of course, the 
Supreme Court’s nationalization of the Bill of Rights through its selective incorporation theory. 
 149. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 580 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see generally Gottschall, Reagan’s 
Appointments to the U.S. Courts of Appeals: The Continuation of a Judicial Revolution, 70 
JUDICATURE 48 (1986). 
 150. Thomas’ 1991 confirmation was especially significant since Thomas replaced Justice 
Thurgood  Marshall, and Justice William Brennan had left the Court a year earlier (replaced by 
David Souter in 1990).  THE OXFORD GUIDE TO THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 394 (Kermit 
L. Hall ed., 1999). 
 151. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 152. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 1125 (1996); City of Boerne v. 
Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
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discussed in Section II, the Court’s decision-making features the creation 
of a new “means and ends” test that makes it virtually impossible for 
Congress to argue that its legislative choices can satisfy constitutional 
muster. 
II.  THE REHNQUIST COURT’S ANTI-FEDERALIST REVIVAL 
The boldness of Rehnquist’s approach in Usery would be repeated, 
and come to fruition, in U.S. v. Lopez,153 the first Supreme Court ruling 
since 1936 to invalidate a congressional statute passed under the 
commerce clause.154  Lopez’s significance is underscored by three earlier 
federalism decisions reflecting the movement toward a firm, and 
intensified, judicial commitment to protecting states’ interests.155  
Gregory v. Ashcroft156 is particularly instructive, as Justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor’s opinion for the Court upheld Missouri’s choice to impose a 
mandatory retirement age of seventy on state judges through its 
Constitution.  O’Connor rebuffed the argument that it violated the Equal 
Protection Clause and was contrary to the Federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act (ADEA), reasoning that the “system of dual 
sovereignty” created by the Constitution’s structure gave the State, a co-
sovereign, the discretion to set the qualifications of those who govern 
it.157 While she conceded that the structural political safeguards might 
protect the states against Congress’ exercise of its plenary commerce 
authority, O’Connor nonetheless decided the case by determining if 
Congress clearly established its intent to have the ADEA’s apply to 
appointed state judges.158 “This plain statement rule,” O’Connor 
explained, “is nothing more than an acknowledgement that the States 
retain substantial sovereign powers under our constitutional scheme, 
powers with which Congress does not readily interfere.”159  As applied, 
Congress did not express its intent clearly, so the ADEA was 
inapplicable and the people’s choice to make state judges retire at 70 
was upheld.160 
 
 153. 514 U.S. 547 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J., Opinion for the Court) (striking down Congress’ 
Gun-Free Zones Act of 1990 as an invalid exercise of commerce power). 
 154. See id. at 605 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 155. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) (finding the Federal Age Discrimination in 
Employment Act inapplicable to appointed state judges); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 
(1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). 
 156. 501 U.S. 452 (1991). 
 157. Id. at 457-63. 
 158. Id. at 467. 
 159. Id. at 460, 464. 
 160. Id. at 473. 
28
Akron Law Review, Vol. 36 [2003], Iss. 3, Art. 2
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol36/iss3/2
BANKS1.DOC 5/5/03  12:07 PM 
2003] SECTION 5 OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 453 
Dissenting Justice Byron White objected that the plain statement 
requirement substantially undercut Congress’ use of the commerce 
power while avoiding the “constitutional problem” of respecting 
legislative supremacy and the operation of the political safeguards 
principle.161  He also chided the Court for dismissing the possibility that 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment could have been used as 
alternative grounds to validly apply the ADEA to the states.  O’Connor 
conceded this as a possibility by admitting that the Court, in past cases, 
held that the Civil War Amendments can be an enforcement mechanism 
under Section 5 that outweighs federalism principles favoring 
recognition of state sovereignty.162  Justice White questioned its source 
as well, claiming that the Court improperly manufactured it from 
Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon,163 an inapposite Eleventh 
Amendment case.164 
White’s lament in Gregory was refined into extant constitutional 
doctrine in the Court’s subsequent federalism and Section 5 
jurisprudence, particularly in the aftermath of Thomas’ November 1991 
confirmation and White’s retirement in July 1993.165  Like Brennan 
before him, White surely perceived that the Court was in the formative 
stages of a new federalism revolution.  National legislation would be 
tested against a re-invigorated concept of state sovereignty that 
increasingly became the judicial mantra for affirmatively limiting not 
only Congress’ otherwise sacrosanct commerce power, but also as the 
means to wipe the dust off the Tenth, and now, the Eleventh 
 
 161. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 479 (White, J., dissenting).  He also argued it conflicts with the 
Court’s pre-emption rules.  Id. at 475.  This argument would be repeated later by Justice John Paul 
Stevens in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
658 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 162. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 479; see also Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) 
(holding that the Eleventh Amendment’s principle of state sovereignty is limited by Section 5 of the 
Fourteenth Amendment).  In Gregory, Justice O’Connor observed that the Court, in EEOC v. 
Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983), left open the question of whether the national legislature could have 
used Section 5 as the source for extending the ADEA to the states.  Gregory, 501 U.S. at 468.  
Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion answered it by stating that “[i]n the face of such ambiguity 
[about Congress’s intent for the ADEA to cover state appointed judges], we will not attribute to 
Congress an intent to intrude on state governmental functions regardless of whether Congress acted 
pursuant to its Commerce Clause or [Section] 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 470. 
 163. 473 U.S. 234, 243 (1985) (barring private action in federal court since Congress did not, 
in unmistakable language, express its intent to abrogate Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 
through the Rehabilitation Act). 
 164. Gregory, 501 U.S. at 476 (White, J., dissenting). 
 165. Justice Thomas replaced Thurgood Marshall in 1991, and Ruth B. Ginsburg replaced 
Justice White in August 1993.  OXFORD GUIDE TO UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 
394 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1999). 
29
Banks: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
BANKS1.DOC 5/5/03  12:07 PM 
454 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:425 
Amendment.  As Gregory (and later, Lopez) signaled, the Court was 
going use its judicial authority to be a champion of state sovereignty.  It 
demonstrated that it was prepared to discover innovative principles, like 
the plain statement rule, to defend states’ rights. 
In the next two terms after Lopez the Court decided Seminole Tribe 
of Florida v. Florida166 and City of Boerne v. Flores.167  These two 
landmark rulings greatly limited federal judicial power under the 
Eleventh Amendment (Seminole) and federal legislative power (Boerne) 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth.  While Lopez settled whether the 
Tenth Amendment could nullify congressional legislation under Article 
1, Section 8, in overturning Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Company168 
Seminole Tribe held that the Indian Commerce Clause could not 
authorize private lawsuits by Indian Tribes against states in federal court 
under the Eleventh Amendment.169  Then, after recognizing that the 
Eleventh Amendment affords the states’ immunity as an “attribute” of 
their sovereignty, in a five-to-four decision Chief Justice Rehnquist 
dismissed the proposition that the federal Indian Gaming Regulatory Act 
(enacted under Article I, Section 8, clause 3) gave the tribes a federal 
forum for compelling Florida to negotiate in good faith and enter into a 
compact for the purpose of legally engaging in gaming activities.170  
Florida, the Chief Justice noted, did not consent to be sued; thus 
Congress lacked the power to abrogate the immunity granted the state by 
the Eleventh Amendment, in spite of Congress’ clear intention to do so, 
as expressed in the legislation.171 
Gregory’s plain statement rule emasculated the national 
legislature’s ability to upset the sovereign choices of a state because the 
federal ADEA did not clearly express an intent to apply it to state 
 
 166. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
 167. 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 168. 491 U.S. 1 (1989). 
 169. Seminole, 517 U.S. 44.  The deciding pro-national fifth vote was cast by Justice White.  
Id.  (Rehnquist, C.J., Opinion for the Court). 
 170. Id. at 54; see also Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890) (Eleventh Amendment bars 
lawsuits in federal court by citizens against their own State if State has not consented to being sued).  
Prior to Seminole, Hans is generally considered the outer limits of Eleventh Amendment sovereign 
immunity doctrine. Christopher E. Sherer, The Resurgence of Federalism: State Employees and the 
Eleventh Amendment, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1, 4 (2001). 
 171. Seminole, 517 U.S. at 72.  “Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-
making authority over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional 
authorization of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.”  Id.  The Court’s analysis was 
guided by two questions: 1) Did Congress unequivocally express its intent to abrogate immunity?; 
and 2) Does Congress have the constitutional power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
to do so?  Id. at 55. 
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citizens purportedly covered under the statute.  The plain statement 
rule’s cousin, the “clear statement rule,”172 was applied in Seminole to 
deny Congress the power to let Indian Tribes sue a state and disrupt its 
sovereignty, even though it unequivocally indicated an intent to do so.173  
Seminole is also significant for leaving intact only one of the two 
remaining basises for Congress to ground its authority to abrogate state 
sovereignty immunity, namely the Fourteenth Amendment enforcement 
power in Section 5.174  Thus, by eliminating Union Gas, Seminole told 
Congress it no longer enjoyed power to circumvent state immunity by 
relying on the Commerce or Supremacy Clause.175 
Shortly after Seminole the Court used the Eleventh Amendment to 
immunize unconsenting states from federal claims in state courts.176  
Yet, it also used Seminole to voice respect for Congress’ Section 5 
authority to constrain, in theory, state sovereignty in Eleventh 
Amendment cases.177  The Court also started to utilize the principles 
crafted in Boerne to insure that the judiciary would be able to 
superintend closely the choices the national legislature made when it 
passed laws affecting the states in all federalism cases with civil rights 
and liberties implications.  In Boerne, Congress relied on Section 5 to 
enact the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 
legislation having the effect of reversing the Court’s 1990 decision in 
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. 
Smith.178  The RFRA represented Congress’ repudiation of Smith, which 
jettisoned the balancing test approach that had long characterized 
judicial review of free exercise cases involving state laws (e.g. 
unemployment compensation statutes) that failed to exempt certain 
religious practices from their coverage at the expense of religious 
liberty.179  The new law hence replaced Smith’s more restrictive “general 
 
 172. Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 
234, 238-39 (1985)). 
 173. Id. at 56. 
 174. Id. at 59 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452-56 (1976)).  Hence, Fitzpatrick is 
important because it adheres to the principle that the Eleventh Amendment immunity can be 
abrogated by a federal law enacted under Section 5 authority. 
 175. See Seminole, 517 U.S. at 93-95 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Notably, a State can also 
consent to be sued by waiving its rights not to be subject to litigation.  Florida Prepaid 
Postsecondary Ed. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 670 (1999) (Scalia, J., 
Opinion for the Court).  See also Sherer, supra note 171, at 7. 
 176. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 177. See, e.g., College Savings, 527 U.S. 672 (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. 445). 
 178. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). 
 179. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (nullifying state unemployment 
compensation denying benefits to Seven Day Adventist who refused to work on day of Sabbath). 
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applicability” standard with the more familiar and lenient balancing 
test,180 a policy judgment that was negated by the Supreme Court in 
Boerne. 
Justice Anthony Kennedy’s opinion for the Court described Section 
5 as a broad grant of authority that is limited in its operation.  Kennedy 
first cast doubt on whether Congress’ purpose in passing the RFRA was 
legitimate, as there was little in the legislative record to indicate that 
there was a “widespread pattern of religious discrimination in this 
country.”181  This was significant, Kennedy continued, for only federal 
law that “deters or remedies constitutional violations” is a legitimate 
exercise of legislative discretion, “even if in the process [the 
enforcement power] prohibits conduct which is not itself 
unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of autonomy’ 
previously reserved to the States.”182 But where Congress alters the 
constitutional meaning of a right, as it does here, congressional action 
will not be sustained because it is not “enforcing” the liberties outlined 
in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.183  Accordingly, only laws 
exhibiting “congruence and a proportionality between the injury to be 
prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end” are 
constitutionally valid, since those without it are deficient because they 
may be too “substantive in operation and effect.”184  As a result, the 
standard empowers the judiciary to determine if Congress has not 
overstepped its bounds by creating inappropriate legislation under 
Section 5 that impermissibly puts too much substantive meaning on the 
rights outlined in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
In the Court’s view, the Constitution’s text, structure and history 
supported the creation of the congruence and proportionality test.185  Of 
particular relevance was the framers’ decision to reject Ohio 
representative John Bingham’s first draft of Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, a proposal exacerbating the fear that Congress would 
interfere with “traditional areas of state responsibility” by permitting it 
to enact “all laws” that are “necessary and proper” to secure Section 1 
 
 180. See Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (upholding criminal prosecution against native Americans 
claiming exemption from state law based on religious use of peyote).  Scalia fashioned the “general 
applicability” principle to evaluate the constitutionality of state laws allegedly burdening free 
exercise.  It stated that laws having an “incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise 
valid provision” do not violate the First Amendment.  Id. at 878. 
 181. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 531 (1997). 
 182. Id. at 518 (emphasis provided) (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)). 
 183. Id. at 519. 
 184. Id. at 520. 
 185. Id. at 515-29. 
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liberties.186  The new draft (and the final enactment) that replaced 
Bingham’s initial version signified that Congress’ power is limited to 
correcting unjust state legislation that violated Section 1 guarantees.187  
This interpretation is accurate, said Kennedy, for it respects “traditional 
separation of powers between Congress and the Judiciary” by investing 
in the Court the power to construe the meaning of self-executing 
provisions of the Bill of Rights.188  If it were otherwise, and Congress 
instead of the Court was able to determine what the Constitution meant 
substantively, “[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the 
Constitution and effectively circumvent the difficult and detailed 
amendment process contained in Article V.”189 
The Court’s interpretativism in Boerne is demonstrated by its 
reading of precedent, namely its re-affirmation of The Civil Rights 
Cases190 and its corresponding denigration of that case’s antithesis, 
Katzenbach v. Morgan.191  Whereas the former opinion epitomized the 
tenet that enforcement legislation must be corrective against (largely) 
state action,192 the expansive character of the latter (presumably because 
of Morgan’s footnote ten) was “not a necessary interpretation . . . or 
even the best one.”193  Indeed, Justice Kennedy strained to put the best 
light he could on Morgan, observing that one of the alternative rationales 
supported its result because the Court at that time “perceived a factual 
basis on which Congress could have concluded that New York’s literacy 
requirement” was discriminatory and an equal protection violation.194  
What Morgan actually said, though, is that the Court could have 
“perceive[d] a basis,” not necessarily a “factual” one, as Kennedy 
wrote.195 The judicial gloss put on the phrase is subtle, but nonetheless 
significant. It allowed Kennedy to align Morgan with his reading of 
 
 186. Id. at 520-22. 
 187. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 522-23. 
 188. Id. at 523-24. 
 189. Id. at 529. 
 190. 109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 191. 384 U.S. 641 (1966). 
 192. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 524-25. 
 193. Id. at 528.  Kennedy obliquely refers to Morgan as having language that “could be 
interpreted as acknowledging a power in Congress to enact legislation that expands the rights 
contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  Id. at 527-28.  However, he does not cite 
footnote 10 in Morgan.  See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 641, n.10. 
 194. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529 (emphasis added). The other rationale was that Section 4(e) of the 
1965 Voting Rights Act is remedial because it corrects “discrimination in governmental services.” 
Id. at 528. 
 195. See Morgan, 384 U.S. at 641, 653 & 656.  Compare Morgan, 384 U.S. at 641, with 
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 529. 
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South Carolina v. Katzenbach196 and Oregon v. Mitchell, two cases that, 
in Boerne, suggested that the Court must limit the enforcement power by 
stringently reviewing whether Congress compiled an extensive 
legislative record to document the pervasive nature of the constitutional 
problem that the legislation is supposed to correct.197 
While Justice Kennedy discovered a way to reconcile the Court’s 
past anti-federalist interpretation of Section 5 cases with more 
progressive opinions coming from the Warren Court, he failed to explain 
the constitutional origin or justification for the language he utilized to 
construct the congruence and proportionality standard.198  Nevertheless, 
as a legal standard it remains a reformulated, but more stringent, version 
of the “means/ends” inquiry that has characterized the judiciary’s past 
assessment of “appropriate” legislation.199  In theory, evaluating 
congruence and proportionality asks if the federal law is not only 
remedial but also a deterrent to the commission of future constitutional 
violations.200  As applied, it imposes a number of doctrinal and 
pragmatic constraints on Congress’ ability to fix or prevent perceived 
unconstitutional behavior by the states or private parties.  In other words, 
it is a constitutional trump card that the Court can play at any time to 
nullify national legislation that, from the Marble Temple’s vantage point 
on Front Street, deems “inappropriate.”  It is not surprising, then, that the 
Rehnquist Court has used it along with more generalized anti-federalist 
legal principles to negate congressional action in several post-Boerne 
federalism cases, particularly in those testing the limits of Eleventh 
 
 196. 383 U.S. 301 (1966). 
 197. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 525-28. 
 198. Justice Kennedy does not specifically explain where the terms “congruence” or 
“proportionality” come from, although he indirectly refers to “means/ends” by examining past 
precedent.  In certain areas of jurisprudence, like affirmative action, cases like Fullilove v. 
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980), have applied a means/ends test to uphold the constitutionality of a 
ten percent set aside (of federal monies) for public works projects for minority-owned businesses; 
but there, only three Justices (Burger, Powell, and White) of a six-Justice plurality (Marshall, 
Brennan, and Blackmun) agreed that Congress tailored the law narrowly enough under the 
legislative objectives pursuant to either Section 5 or the Article 1 spending clause.  Perhaps that is 
why Fullilove is not cited by Kennedy in Boerne, but it does not explain why he did not attempt to 
trace the Court’s usage of the means/ends test in past precedent (other than to refer generally to The 
Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883) in support of the means/ends rationale).  See Boerne, 521 U.S. 
507.  For an analysis of the Court’s usage of means/ends and Fullilove’s significance, see Marci A. 
Hamilton & David Schoenbrod, Symposium, The Reaffirmation of Proportionality Analysis Under 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 469 (1999) (arguing Boerne’s 
proportionality standard is clearly traceable to past Supreme Court cases). 
 199. See Evan H. Caminker, Symposium, “Appropriate” Means-Ends Constraints on Section 5 
Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1127 (2001). 
 200. Christopher E. Sherer, The Resurgence of Federalism: State Employees and the Eleventh 
Amendment, 23 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & Pol’y 1, 8 (2001). 
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Amendment sovereign immunity.201 
Hence, in five-to-four rulings, with College Savings Bank v. 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board202 and 
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College 
Savings Bank203 the Supreme Court held that neither the 1992 
Trademark Remedy Clarification Act (College Savings) or the 1992 
Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act (Florida 
Prepaid) validly abrogated, under Section 5, state sovereign 
immunity.204  In College Savings, the Court dismissed a private action 
for damages that was based on the contention that a state’s alleged use of 
false descriptions or representations concerning a patent qualified as a 
constitutionally protected property right under the Due Process Clause, 
notably without even applying the congruence and proportionality 
test.205  Whereas the Court could not find a right to enforce in College 
Savings, it reached the question of appropriateness in its companion 
case, Florida Prepaid.  There, Chief Justice Rehnquist’s plurality 
opinion reasoned that the Patent Remedy Act was not remedial because 
there was little evidence in the legislative record to prove that Congress 
was responding to an identifiable pattern of patent infringement (or 
constitutional violations) by the states or, in fact, a national problem.206  
Thus, the Act was an unconstitutional enforcement mechanism, since 
disproportionate means were used to achieve a perceived, but 
unsubstantiated, end.207 
Having shown it was reluctant to extend Section 5 power to cure 
due process violations in Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents,208 the 
Court, in the next term addressed whether Congress can use Section 5 to 
prevent alleged violations of equal protection originating from age 
discrimination.  Although Congress exhibited a clear intent in the Age 
 
 201. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel 
v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (1999); Fla. Prepaid PostSecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. 
Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999); Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
 202. 527 U.S. 666 (1999). 
 203. 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
 204. College Savings held that the state did not constructively waive its sovereign immunity 
under the Eleventh Amendment, and that the Act did not validly abrogate it.  527 U.S. 666.  In so 
holding, the Court overturned Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co. of Ala. State Docks Dept., 377 U.S. 184 
(1964).  Id. at 680.  Florida Prepaid held that Congress intended to abrogate immunity, but could 
not validly do so because Congress lacked Section 5 authority.  527 U.S. 627. 
 205. 527 U.S. at 672. 
 206. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 641. 
 207. Id. at 640. 
 208. 528 U.S. 62 (2000). 
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Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) to abrogate state sovereign 
immunity, the Court held (as per Justice Sandra Day O’Connor) that it 
lacked the power under Section 5 to subject non-consenting States to 
private lawsuits in federal court alleging age discrimination.  After 
acknowledging that Section 5 gives Congress the authority to remedy 
and deter rights’ violations under the Fourteenth Amendment, O’Connor 
reiterated the Boerne principle that the Congress had little say in 
fashioning the content of what those rights are.209 Rather, she declared, 
“[t]he ultimate interpretation and determination of the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial 
Branch.”210 
From this premise the Court applied Boerne’s congruence and 
proportionality test for appropriateness.  In doing so O’Connor observed 
that Congress, in providing “indiscriminate” substantive and 
prophylactic remedies under the ADEA, failed to establish in 
“widespread and unconstitutional age discrimination by the States.”211 
Notably, the implications of having a scant record were more profound, 
if not conclusive, in deciding the case.  As O’Connor explained, the 
Court’s past equal protection jurisprudence has, in effect, given the 
states more latitude to engage in age discrimination without running 
afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment, provided the offending state can 
demonstrate that its age classification is rationally connected to a 
legitimate state interest.  Because of rational basis review, in other 
words, the Court cannot use heightened scrutiny and require “a tighter fit 
between the discriminatory means and the legitimate ends they serve,” 
as would be the case in lawsuits testing race or gender classifications.212  
As a result, in Kimel the Court sent at least three anti-federalist 
messages: 1) that the Court is the final arbiter of what the Fourteenth 
Amendment substantively means; 2) that states can sometimes 
reasonably discriminate on the basis of age classifications in spite of the 
Equal Protection Clause; and, 3) that Congress has limited Section 5 
power to combat age discrimination in the states only if it can prove, in 
the legislative record or otherwise, that it enacted remedial or 
prophylactic legislation in response to a national problem of age 
discrimination occurring in the states.213 
 
 209. Id. at 81. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. at 91. 
 212. Id. at 83-84. 
 213. In ruling that Congress lacked power under Section 5, Kimel also answered the open 
“Section 5” question raised in light of the holding in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226 (1983) 
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In a dissent joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg and Breyer, Justice 
Stevens in Kimel expressed dismay at the Court’s hubris in extolling 
state immunity while dismissing the structural political safeguards 
argument that once held sway in adjudicating federalism cases.214  Even 
so, United States v. Morrison and Board of Trustees of the University of 
Alabama v. Garrett, indicate that the Court-centered anti-federalist 
philosophy is firmly entrenched in the five-Justice plurality that often 
controls the outcome of federalism cases.  In Morrison, the Court held 
that Congress did not have commerce or Section 5 authority to supply 
victims of gender-motivated violence with civil remedies in federal court 
through the Violence Against Women Act of 1994 (VAWA).215  
Relative to the Section 5 issue, the Chief Justice, in a five-to-four ruling, 
acknowledged that a “voluminous congressional record” was compiled 
to document the abuses suffered by victims of gender discrimination in 
state courts.216 Yet in light of the language and purpose of the Fourteenth 
Amendment and, in accordance with past precedent,217 Congress had 
limited power to devise remedies against non-state (i.e. private) 
actors.218  Thus, the Court ruled the Boerne test of proportionality was 
not satisfied because the VAWA was not corrective enough in terms of 
combating discriminatory violence from the operation of state laws or 
officers.219  Moreover, in dicta, Chief Justice Rehnquist expressed 
Kimel’s conviction that it is the duty of the Court, and not Congress, to 
discern the Constitution’s final meaning.220 
Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett 
reaffirmed that “it is the responsibility of this Court”221 to limit the 
substantive reach of the Fourteenth Amendment.  There, the Chief 
Justice for a five-to-four Court held that two state employees (one was 
diagnosed with breast cancer and, after treatment, demoted in her nurse’s 
job at a state hospital) could not sue under the Americans With 
Disabilities Act (ADA) for money damages in federal court because 
 
(holding that the ADEA was a valid exercise of national commerce power on the states in spite of 
the Tenth Amendment).  See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 78. 
 214. Id. at 92-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 215. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 and 626 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., Opinion for the 
Court). 
 216. Id. at 620, 625. 
 217. Id. at 621-26 (citing principally The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), and United 
States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1883), as supportive of the state action doctrine). 
 218. Id. at 620-21. 
 219. Id. at 625. 
 220. Id. at 616 n.7. 
 221. 531 U.S. 356, 365 (2001) (emphasis provided). 
37
Banks: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
BANKS1.DOC 5/5/03  12:07 PM 
462 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:425 
Congress did not have Section 5 power to abrogate state immunity.222  
After noting that the Court’s equal protection analysis concerning the 
disabled required rationality review, Rehnquist concluded that the 
“States are not required . . . to make special accommodations for the 
disabled, so long as their actions towards such individuals are 
rational.”223 After identifying the scope of the constitutional right, 
Rehnquist next applied Boerne’s congruence standard to hold that 
Congress exceeded its power by creating an anti-discrimination remedy 
on the states because there was insufficient proof that the states were 
irrationally engaged in a consistent and recurring past pattern of 
discrimination.224 In contrast to legislation that enforced the Fifteenth 
Amendment’s proscription against racial discrimination in voting, the 
record did not disclose that Congress “explored with great care” the 
problem of how those with disabilities are treated in the states.225  
Accordingly, as the Boerne progeny illustrates, the Court in Garrett 
ruled that the remedy (i.e. the ADA) was disproportionate to the aim of 
eliminating discrimination against the disabled.226 
III.  NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF HUMAN RESOURCES V. HIBBS AND THE 
POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
As Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents and Board of Trustees of the 
University of Alabama v. Garrett reveal, state-sponsored age (Kimmel) 
and disability (Garrett) classifications are presumptively constitutional 
under the Equal Protection Clause because the Court evaluates them 
under rational basis review.  Thus, when Congress devises a statutory 
remedy to combat state-sponsored discrimination involving 
presumptively constitutional conduct, it is harder under the congruence 
and proportionality test for Congress to claim that it is an appropriate 
exercise of Section 5 power.  Congress has to compile an extensive 
record to justify that its remedy is a proportionate response to the 
perceived discriminatory evil it is trying to eradicate.  Part of that 
justification, also, requires the legislature to establish that it is acting in 
 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 367 (interpreting City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432 
(1985)). Rehnquist continued by saying that the States “could be quite hard headedly—and perhaps 
hardheartedly—hold to job-qualification requirements which do not make allowance for the 
disabled.  If special accommodations for the disabled are to be required, they have to come from 
positive law and not through the Equal Protection Clause.”  Id. at 367-68. 
 224. Id. at 368-74. 
 225. Id. at 373. 
 226. Id. at 374. 
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an area of law that the Court has recognized as a legitimate province of 
rights’ protection, as in race-based voting rights cases.  To be sure, as 
City of Boerne v. Flores indicates, Congress’ burden is even greater 
when it enacts prophalytic legislation in a social policy area that 
arguably goes beyond the substantive limits the Court has imposed on 
the meaning of rights contained in Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. 
In United States v. Morrison the Court ruled that a victim of 
gender-based violence could not sue under the Equal Protection Clause 
because the Violence Against Women’s Act was not directed at State 
action; hence, it was an invalid exercise of Section 5 power.227  Because 
the Court did not find that there was a protected right to be enforced in 
Morrison, it is an open question whether Congress can provide a remedy 
under Section 5 in a sex-based discrimination case involving Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  One would intuit that Congress would have an 
easier time proving to the Court that it is appropriately enforcing a 
statutory remedy that is directed against state conduct that is 
presumptively unconstitutional because of heightened scrutiny.228  
Indeed, in Kimel the Court reiterated that states have less leeway to 
demonstrate that race or gender-based classifications are validly serving 
legitimate legislative objectives.229  Moreover, even though the Court 
has said that what the record reveals is not necessarily determinative in 
evaluating whether the law is appropriately proportionate to the 
perceived harm,230 Congress probably has a better chance of convincing 
the Court that the legislative means fit the ends if it can establish that it 
is reacting to a pervasive, nationwide problem of gender discrimination. 
These propositions will be tested in Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs,231 where the Supreme Court will decide in the 2002-
2003 Term if the Ninth Circuit was correct in holding that Congress 
intended, and had the constitutional power, to abrogate Nevada’s 
Eleventh Amendment immunity from a private lawsuit claming damages 
 
 227. U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 626 (2000). 
 228. See Sherer, supra note 159, at 20-21. 
 229. See Kimmel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 84.  “[W]hen a State discriminates on the 
basis of race or gender, we required a tighter fit between the discriminatory means and the 
legitimate ends they serve.”  Id. 
 230. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 646 
(1999). 
 231. Hibbs v. Nev. Dep’t of Human Res., 273 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. 
Ct. 2618 (2002).  The U.S. Supreme Court entertained oral arguments in the case on January 15, 
2002.  See Transcript of Oral Argument in Nevada Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs (No. 01-1368) 
(Jan. 15, 2003), available at, http://www.supremecourtus.gov (last visited Jan. 29, 2003). 
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under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA).232 
Specifically, the Court will review if the Ninth Circuit was correct in 
limiting states’ rights and ruling in favor of William Hibbs, who used the 
FMLA in conjunction with the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal 
Protection Clause to claim he was entitled to money damages when the 
state fired him because he used too much leave to care for his ailing 
wife.  After finding that Congress intended to displace immunity, the 
circuit court next held that Congress had Section 5 power to abrogate 
Nevada’s immunity because it was the state’s burden (and not 
Congress’) to prove that the state had not engaged in past acts of 
unconstitutional gender discrimination in the workplace. That 
reallocation of proof, the court reasoned, was justified because 
heightened scrutiny, instead of rational basis review, controlled the 
outcome of gender-based discrimination cases. In other words, laws like 
the FMLA are presumptively constitutional in that they prevent gender 
discrimination and, therefore, “the burden is on the challenger of the 
legislation to prove that the states have not engaged in a pattern of 
unconstitutional conduct.”233 Accordingly, because Nevada could not 
prove if a pattern of past gender discrimination did not exist, the Ninth 
Circuit ruled that Hibbs, a private individual, could sue in federal court 
using the FMLA as an appropriate remedial statute.234 
Assuming that Congress can establish it intended to abrogate 
immunity,235 the outcome in Hibbs might turn on whether the Supreme 
Court accepts the lower court’s conclusion that the FMLA, like Section 
5 legislation that is aimed at remedying gender discrimination, is 
presumptively constitutional because of heightened judicial review.  If 
the Court agrees, then Nevada, instead of Congress, will have to prove 
that there is no state-sponsored discrimination.  If the burden is shifted, 
then the law might be held to be appropriate since Congress need not 
establish that it has created a law that corrects a widespread pattern of 
sexually discriminatory conduct in the workplace.  Notably, however, 
the Court has another way to avoid making the choice about who 
sustains the burden of proving unconstitutional behavior by ruling that 
Congress went too far in defining the scope of the right at issue by 
 
 232. Plaintiff Hibbs alleged, inter alia, that his employer, the Nevada Department of Human 
Resources, wrongfully terminated his position in contravention to the provisions of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act.  Hibbs, 273 F.3d 844. 
 233. Id. at 864 n.27. 
 234. Id. at 873. 
 235. This does not seem to be an obstacle since the FMLA “intent” mirrors the one in the Fair 
Labor Standards Act. 
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requiring states give at least twelve weeks of family leave.  As the Hibbs 
court observed (but concluded it was not a fatal defect in the Section 5 
analysis), the operative provision of the FMLA, Section 2612(a)(1)(C), 
“sweeps more broadly than the Equal Protection Clause itself” because 
states providing less than twelve weeks of leave would be acting 
constitutionally if they did so in a gender-neutral fashion.236  If that is the 
case then the Supreme Court could rule against Hibbs on the basis that 
Congress is improperly trying to change the substantive nature of a right 
under equal protection law, something that can only be done by the 
judiciary (as established in The City of Flores v. Boerne).237  In other 
words, the reluctance of the Rehnquist Court to cede its authority to 
determine what the meaning of the Constitution is, will in all likelihood, 
strongly influence what the result will be in Hibbs. 
A.  Judicial Supremacy and the Role of History in Federalism (and 
Section 5) Cases 
As Hibbs will undoubtedly underscore, the debate surrounding the 
scope of congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
substantive content is an ongoing constitutional enterprise. It is a 
historical and contemporary fact of judicial life as the meaning of 
Section 1 is timelessly indeterminate.  Consequently, the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s history suggests that the various compromises the framers 
made to strike an agreement on the Amendment’s equality language is 
an essential part of it “ultimate emptiness.”238  As law professor William 
Nelson puts it, 
Americans of 1866, like Americans of today, could all agree upon the 
rightfulness of equality only because they did not agree on its meaning, 
and their political leaders, unlike the managers of the modern 
bureaucratic state, were content to enact the general principle rather 
than its specific applications into law.239 
If Nelson is correct, determining what equality specifically means 
assumes less importance in the Section 5 debate, as long as the general 
principle of equality remains true. Furthermore, the key question to 
answer in contemplating Congress’ institutional role in protecting liberty 
is whether the Court can justly reject legislation aiming to enforce the 
 
 236. 273 F.3d 844, 856. 
 237. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 238. WILLIAM E. NELSON, THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT: FROM POLITICAL PRINCIPLES TO 
JUDICIAL DOCTRINE 80 (1988). 
 239. Id. 
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equality principle, however defined, in palpable situations where social 
inequality reigns. While it is useful to observe that the Amendment’s 
historical origin is rooted in an attempt to aid blacks in securing their 
political and legal rights in the aftermath of the Civil War, looking at 
history is only the beginning, and not the end, of discovering the scope 
of congressional power to enforce the Section 1 rights.  What matters, 
and what should drive any argument on the issue to its logical 
conclusion, is that the Amendment must be given the benefit of its most 
favorable equality construction whenever feasible, and contrary 
justifications must not trump any attempt by government to provide for 
the common good.  It is hard to aver, at least plausibly, that giving all 
persons, no matter what race, sex, creed or color, a lawful, and equal 
opportunity to succeed in a free society is not a worthy goal that is part 
of achieving the common good.240 
Consequently, it can only be a distortion of history, and judicial 
power, to permit a court to twist the salutary language (albeit couched in 
generalities) of the Fourteenth Amendment into a judicial doctrine that 
hinders, or destroys, basic civil rights.  If Nelson is accurate in saying 
that “[all could] agree on the rightfulness of equality,”241 then how can it 
be correct, historically or otherwise, to argue that a judge or court can 
use the highest law of the land to say that that Congress lacks the power 
to make things equal?  If anything, as Justice William Brennan 
suggested in Katzenbach v. Morgan,242 congressional power to further 
the substantive guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment should only be 
nullified if the legislature enacts laws that take away the liberty of 
individuals.  If Congress is acting with an altruistic purpose, arguments 
saying that it is giving too much liberty at the expense of the states are 
specious and, perhaps, beside the point. After all, as Justice Stephen 
Breyer reminds us, formalistic notions of sovereignty should not stand in 
the way of the real object of the American system of federalism, which 
is to protect citizen liberty.243  This idea was not lost on the Supreme 
Court in U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton,244 a ruling that validated national 
authority on the basis that the people’s sovereignty, and not the 
 
 240. As one framer of the Amendment, Thadeus Stevens, said: “The substance of section 
one . . . required only that ‘the same laws must and shall apply to every mortal, American, Irishman, 
African, German or Turk.’”  Id. at 116. 
 241. Id. at 80. 
 242. 384 U.S. 641, 651 n.10 (1966). 
 243. Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 702 
(1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 244. 514 U.S. 779 (1995) (Stevens, J., Opinion for the Court, joined by JJ. Souter, Ginsburg, 
Breyer, and Kennedy). 
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sovereignty of the states, is what matters most.245 
Does it change anything to concede that the national, or state, 
government has more sovereign power than the other if both are 
committed, in theory, to promoting social equality?  What does history 
tell us in trying to answer that question?  First, the history aimed at 
trying to discover the framing intent of the Fourteenth Amendment is 
inconclusive, because there are compelling arguments on both sides of 
the debate concerning the scope of national power to define Section 1 
rights.246  While of course relevant, the history of trying to determine 
what the founding generation meant in constructing a political system 
featuring separation of powers and federalism principles is nonetheless 
likewise indeterminate and subject to conflicting interpretations.247 One 
place where history might instruct us is to look at is the objective facts of 
America’s political and social evolution. It is virtually incontestable to 
argue that James Madison, the principal architect of the Constitution, 
went to Philadelphia with a plan in hand to replace the Articles of 
Confederation and strengthen considerably the power of the national 
government.248  It is clear that is precisely what the Constitutional 
Convention did.249  There is no doubt that the Civil War was fought, and 
that bloody affair, at least temporarily, resolved any issues about the 
supremacy of the national government over the states.  It is verifiable 
that the Civil War Amendments were a direct response to the Union 
victory and the perceived problem on how to deal with the freedmen 
after emancipation; and that the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted to 
protect, at least, the black race against punitive legislation that took 
 
 245. But see id. at 845 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  In U.S. Term Limits, the Court invalidated an 
Amendment to the Arkansas state constitution that put term limits on the length of time national 
representatives can serve.  Id. at 783. 
 246. For one view of the scholarship and a response to it, see Robert J. Kaczorowski, 
Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
863 (1986). 
 247. See, e.g., the conflicting opinions between Justices Stevens, Kennedy, and Thomas in U.S. 
Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 248. Indeed, his writings before and after the Convention argued that the national government 
ought to enjoy a veto over state laws, a proposal that was defeated by his fellow statesmen in 
Philadelphia.  Charles F. Hobson, The Negative on State Laws: James Madison, the Constitution, 
and the Crisis of Republican Government, 36 WM. & MARY Q. 215 (1979).  Madison’s reading of 
history told him that small republics are destined to fail if the mutability of legislation and factional 
rule was not contained by a republican structure.  See id.; James Madison, Vices of the Political 
System of the United States, reprinted in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 361 (1901); James Madison, 
Of Ancient and Modern Confederacies, reprinted in 2 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 369 (1901); Letter 
from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (October 24, 1787), reprinted in 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES 
MADISON 17 (1904). 
 249. See Christopher Wolfe, Understanding the 1787 Convention, 39 J. POLITICS 97 (1977). 
43
Banks: Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2003
BANKS1.DOC 5/5/03  12:07 PM 
468 AKRON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:425 
away their rights as free persons.250  History also is informative in 
conveying that the national government centralized its authority more 
after the post-1937 New Deal period.  And finally, that America 
remained burdened by a “separate but equal” doctrine until the Supreme 
Court cast it off in several landmark rulings that declared an equal 
protection mandate for integrated schools and, significantly, the 
institutional capacity of the high court to enforce it.251 
Another historical fact is that the terms of Section 5 are quite 
explicit, and it is counter-intuitive to find an interpretation in history to 
claim that it is vague.  As written, Section 5 is a clear grant of legislative 
authority to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
appropriate legislation.  In contrast, there is absolutely nothing in the 
founding document that establishes the judiciary’s power to implement 
its principles, let alone stake a claim that it is the only branch of 
government to do so.252  One could even point out, as some have,253 that 
meekly accepting the Court’s self-imposed claim to be the final arbiter 
of constitutional interpretation is to cheapen the founding document and 
what it represents.  In other words, by “reconceiv[ing] the Constitution 
to buttress [a] claim to interpretive supremacy [and] treating the 
Constitution mainly as a set of legal restraints rather than an instrument 
enabling self-government,” writes professor Christopher Eisgruber, “the 
Court has made more plausible the idea that constitutional interpretation 
is exclusively the province of lawyers—a professional elite who may 
have no special insight into justice or politics but who are expert at the 
manipulation of fine-grained rules.”254  In short, given the equality 
principle and the Amendment that epitomizes it, a judicial (and perhaps 
elitist) interpretation that saps the Amendment’s “lifeblood”255 and 
drains its language of any equality meaning is simply not persuasive in 
law, morality or politics.  That kind of construction unduly complicates a 
very simple idea: that all men are created equal. 
 
 250. See Eugene Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. 
REV. 1323 (1952). 
 251. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294 
(1955); Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). 
 252. CHRISTOPHER L. EISGRUBER, Judicial Supremacy and Constitutional Distortion, in 
CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS: ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTION MAKING, MAINTENANCE, AND CHANGE, 
72-73 (2001). 
 253. Id. at 71-74. 
 254. Id. at 71.  Or, as Greve puts it, “[The Court] has . . . brought us to the brink of being 
unable to preempt the trial bar.” Michael S. Greve, Federalism’s Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 
93, 96 (2002). 
 255. Gressman, supra note 251. 
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B.  Institutional Competence 
The Supreme Court should assume a more deferential role because 
it more consistent with a history that respects the basic nationalism of 
the founding design, along with a history that has reaffirmed (in the 
Civil War, Depression, New Deal, desegregation and the attainment of 
voting rights) the proper use of national authority as the country matured 
culturally and socially.256  An integral component of that deference is to 
acknowledge that the states are represented in the political process and 
do not need extra judicial protection.257  And more significantly, that the 
legislature has the institutional competence to study complex problems 
of policy through the open deliberative process of many (instead of the 
opinion writing proclivities of the few in closed chambers).  The Court 
must recognize that insisting on a time-bound version of federalism 
inhibits what Justice Breyer calls a  “necessary legislative flexibility,”258 
which is the ability of the citizenry to have a meaningful voice in 
government.  As Breyer suggested in College Savings, the Court’s 
tendency to treat Congress like an administrative agency in federalism 
cases only discourages active participation in representative government 
and, in the end, becomes a deprivation of freedom in an increasingly 
sophisticated world.259  This frustration manifests itself further in 
litigation where Congress’ good-faith efforts to remedy a social problem 
are thwarted by a hostile judiciary that is never satisfied with the kind of 
evidence that is compiled in the legislative record.260  As Justice Stevens 
lamented in his dissent in College Savings, “the Court must shoulder the 
burden of demonstrating why the judgment of the Congress of the 
United States should not command our respect.”261 
C.  Doctrinal Incoherence 
A judiciary committed to preserving its own power at the expense 
 
 256. See Paul C. Light, Government’s Greatest Achievements of the Past Half Century 
(Reform Watch Brief # 2, November 2000), available at http://www.brook.edu/ (last visited Feb. 3, 
2003) (Brookings Institute policy brief suggesting federal government often had great impact on 
changing America and the globe).  See also Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 702 (1999). 
 257. See U.S. v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 647 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting).  See also Larry D. 
Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
215 (2000). 
 258. College Savings, 527 U.S. at 701 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 259. Id. at 702-04. 
 260. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 630-31 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 261. 527 U.S. at 693 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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of all others in a political system emphasizing a dual government of 
shared powers262 wreaks havoc with the rule of law.  Understanding the 
limits of Congress’ Section 5 power is notoriously difficult because the 
doctrinal position a Justice stakes out is fact-sensitive and always 
affected by a variety of legal and political factors.263  Thus, the Court’s 
decision to wield its power and directly tip the balance of federalism 
towards the states is significant, for it pragmatically influences how 
citizens, and litigants, order their legal expectations in their dealings 
with the legal process.  Court watchers and Supreme Court Justices have 
expressed concern that the Rehnquist Court’s firm commitment of 
respecting, say, a state’s “dignity”264 threatens long-standing doctrinal 
interpretations of pre-emption, Commerce Clause jurisprudence and 
administrative law.265  As Justice Stevens argued in Florida Prepaid, the 
Court’s new federalism has great potential to disrupt the national 
uniformity of patent laws; and significantly, puts too much faith in state 
judiciaries to understand technical legal rules they have little familiarity 
with, while ironically, removing the federal bench who has the requisite 
expertise from their adjudication.266  The creation and ambiguity of the 
Court’s innovative legal standards, like the plain statement rule and the 
reformulated congruence and proportionality test in Boerne will only 
exacerbate the confusion in the lower courts, who are trying to make 
sense of them, especially in light of past precedent that the Court is 
systematically overturning in its frenzy to uphold state sovereignty.267  In 
short, the threat of having “shifting legislative majorities”268 disrupt the 
 
 262. “In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot be deemed a national one; since its 
jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.”  James Madison, Federalist No. 39, in THE FEDERALIST 
PAPERS 245 (Rossiter ed., 1961). 
 263. For an argument claiming judicial decisonmaking is affected primarily by political 
variable, see JEFFREY A. SEGAL ET AL., THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL 
(1993). 
 264. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). 
 265. See, e.g., Michael S. Greve, Federalism’s Frontier, 7 TEX. REV. L. & POL’Y 93, 110-17.  
See also Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 
658 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Fed. Maritime Comm. v. S. Car. State Ports Authority, 535 
U.S. 743, 1881-89 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting); U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995) (Souter, J., 
dissenting). 
 266. Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 651 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Stevens also notes that 
usurping patent authority contradicts the reason why the Federal Circuit was created.  Id. 
 267. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Fla., 517 U.S. 44 (1996), overturning, Pennsylvania 
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); Coll. Savings Bank v. Fla. Prepaid v. Postsecondary Educ. 
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999), overturning, Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co. of Ala. State Docks 
Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 268. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997), where Justice Kennedy 
rationalized that if Congress instead of the Court was able to determine what the Constitution meant 
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balance of federalism has been inexplicably and illegitimately been 
replaced by the shifting coalitions of a divided (often five-to-four) 
Rehnquist Court. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
The significance of Bush v. Gore269 is manifested in the Rehnquist 
Court’s federalism jurisprudence. Although seven Justices in Bush 
perceived that there was an equal protection problem with the challenged 
Florida recount in the 2000 presidential election,270 three Justices 
comprising the core group of the five that often control federalism 
outcomes271 suggested that the Supreme Court needed to step into the 
political thicket and decide the outcome because this was not an 
“ordinary election, but [one dealing with] an election for the President of 
the United States.”272 In discharging that perceived duty Chief Justice 
Rehnquist observed that the usual judicial deference that federal courts 
give state court rulings in election cases cannot obtain.273  As a result, 
the Justices selected the President of the United States and established, 
once again, that it is the Supreme Court. 
The pattern of Section 5 cases decided by the Supreme Court 
epitomizes the same sort of judicial arrogance that characterizes the 
Court’s ill-conceived involvement in Bush v. Gore.274  By refusing to 
abdicate any of its judicial authority, the Court is truly the final arbiter of 
social policy, and it is likely to remain so until the five-to-four voting 
bloc in federalism cases is dissipates.  Therein lies the significance of 
Bush as well, because the Court’s selection of a Republican candidate 
insures that the controlling coalition will remain intact for years to come.  
When it does disappear, as it surely will in time in the interest of 
republican liberty, the Court will confront the messy task of trying to 
restore its own legitimacy and the proper, historic relationship that 
existed between the national government and states before the Rehnquist 
Court asserted its judicial will on the nation. 
 
substantively, “[s]hifting legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively 
circumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in Article V.” 
 269. 531 U.S. 98 (2000). 
 270. Id. at 100 (per curiam). 
 271. Id. at 112 (Rehnquist, J., concurring, joined by JJ. Scalia and Thomas).  Justices 
O’Connor and Kennedy complete the frequently decisive voting coalition. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 112-13. 
 274. See Banks, supra note 21, at 237-64. 
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